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1978,' casino executives have attempted to provide suitable mass
entertainment attractions to lure gamblers to their establishments. 2 As a result, New Jersey's boxing industry has experienced unprecedented growth along with corresponding
4
problems.' The New Jersey State Commission of Investigation
(SCI) noted in a 1984 report that "It]he expansion of the boxing
industry in New Jersey has precipitated increasingly serious
problems caused by inadequate

.

.

.

regulation. These problems

have been exacerbated by the utilization of prizefighting as a
gambling casino business promotion."' Thus, in 1985, the SCI
recommended the abolition of boxing in New Jersey. 6
In an effort to make boxing safer and more reputable within
the state, the New Jersey Legislature has recently introduced legislation seeking reform.7 This article will review those proposed
bills and enacted legislation in New Jersey and compare ongoing
1 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-1 to -5 (West 1988).

Berger, High Rollers Attracted By Major Fights, N.Y. Times, Jul. 23, 1987, at B9,
col. 1.
3 In 1976 there were 11 professional boxing cards presented in New Jersey.
Boxing Reform: Hearingson H.R. 1778 before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transp. and Tourism of the House of Reps. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1983)
(Statement of Robert W. Lee, Deputy Comm'r, N.J. State Athletic Comm'n). This
number rose to 55 in 1980. Id. By 1982 there were 163 boxing cards in New Jersey
which helped the state surpass Nevada as the country's number one state for
presenting boxing matches. Id. at 37. See also Sterling,Jersey Packs a Wallop, StarLedger, Mar. 13, 1983, § 1, at 24-25, col 1 (documenting New Jersey's emergence
as the boxing capital of the nation).
In describing the environment that created the need for boxing reform in New
Jersey, Assemblyman William P. Schuber noted that:
Before the first card was dealt or the first wheel spun in Atlantic City
virtually every aspect of casino gambling was discussed by the Legislature .... Unfortunately, professional boxing did not get the same
scrutiny and the sport literally sprouted overnight.... The effect of
poorly controlled bouts has taken its toll on the public, on the state
and on the sport's participants, the boxers. The fault lies with obsolete legislation controlling boxing.
Schuber, And In This Comer ... Boxing Rules Need Revamping, N.Y. Times, May 20,
1984, at N.J. 26, col. 1.
4 The New Jersey State Commission of Investigation was created in the late
1960s as part of the state's effort to control organized crime. Weissman, The SCI's
Shift In Strategy, Star Ledger, Aug. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
5 Interim Report and Recommendations of the State of New Jersey Commission of Investigation on the InadequateRegulation of Boxing, State of New Jersey Commission of Investigation (March 1, 1984) at 1 [hereinafter SCI Interim Report].
6 See Organized Crime in Boxing, FinalBoxing Report of the State of New Jersey Commission of Investigation, State of NewJersey Commission of Investigation (Dec. 16, 1985)
at 127-31 [hereinafter SCI Final Report]. The report recommended the abolition of
boxing due to the risk of brain damage, the recommendation of the AMA to ban
boxing, and the goal of the participants to intentionally inflict injury. Id.
7 See infra notes 111 to 158 and accompanying text.
2
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efforts with national reforms. This review will demonstrate that
New Jersey has developed high standards for boxing that will
serve as a model for other states across the country. Nevertheless, this article concludes that without federal legislation there
can be no truly effective regulation of boxing within the state.
II.

THE STATUS OF BOXING IN THE UNITED STATES

One critic has noted that "[i]f boxing is a sport, it is the most
tragic of sports."'8 While such an assessment may be extreme, it
is undoubtedly true that boxing is a sport that arouses much passion among both supporters and opponents. As one 1984 New
York Times editorial observed:
No modern society would tolerate gladiators fighting to
death; ours forbids even dog fighting. Boxing appeals to the
same instincts but is condoned because damage seems slightonly a handful of deaths each year as a result of the blood and
violence spectators pay to see. What no one sees until too late
is the lasting damage to boxers' brains....

It's brain damage

that needs banning; boxing can survive without it.'
Controversy involving the sport is not new. In recent times,
especially during the 1980s, boxing has sustained attacks in two major areas.' First, from within its ranks, boxing has been criticized
for the manner in which it crowns champions and ranks boxers and
for its excessive number of sanctioning bodies."' Second, external
criticism has been levied against boxing because of its brutality and
inherent health risks' 2 as well as its alleged links to organized
8 Oates, On Boxing, N.Y. Times,June 16, 1985, § 6 (Magazine), at 30. See also A
Heavyweight Looks At Boxing, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1987, at A16, col. 1.
9 Save Boxing From Barbarism, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1984, at A30, col. 1.
10 See SCI Interim Report, supra note 5; SCI Final Report, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
'' See Katz, State of Boxing: From Boom To Malaise, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1984, at
Bl , col. 1. Boxing promoter Bob Arum has noted that "[b]oxing is in a tremendous decline. It's an absolute travesty. The whole business smells." Id. Boxer Marvin Hagler commented: "Whoever heard of three heavyweight champions of the
world? The public can't keep up with it; this guy was champ last week, but he ain't
champ this week." Id. Similarly, Bobby Goodman who has worked in promoter
Don King's organization as a matchmaker noted that, "[i]t's gotten to the point
where even the professionals can't keep up with all the champions." Id. at B15. See
also Neumann, Suggestions in the Search for Credible Bouts, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1982,
§ 5, at 2, col. 1.
12 See Trumbull, A.M.A., Citing Danger,Asks Abolition of Boxing, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6,
1984, at Al, col. 4. The American Medical Association (AMA) called for the abolition of boxing through the adoption of a resolution citing "the dangerous effects of
boxing on the health of the participants." Id. Dr. Joseph R. Boyle, President of the
AMA, noted that the British and Australian medical associations had taken similar
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3

crime. 1
A.

The Medical Issues

In April 1985, Dr. Robert 0. Voy, the United States Olympic
Committee's Chief Medical Officer, announced that Johns Hopkins School of Public Health would conduct a four-year. study on
the effects of boxing on amateur and Olympic competitors:
Olympic boxing is one of the most popular of the
Olympic sports and a cornerstone of the Olympic movement.
A number of critics have stated that amateur boxers often sustain irreversible and serious injuries, particularly to the brain.
No data exists to support or refute these claims. This study
will provide answers ...

14

Boxing's inherently brutal nature is the fundamental reason for
seeking its abolition. The longstanding concern of the American
Medical Association (AMA) regarding medical complications has led
it to call repeatedly for a ban on the sport.' 5 At the 1984 convention
stands against boxing. Id. at B3, col. 5. See also Lundberg, Boxing Should Be Banned In
Civilized Countries, 249J. A.M.A. 250 (Jan. 14, 1983).
Dr. Nelson Richards, president of the American Academy of Neurology, also
called for a ban on boxing after observing Muhammad Ali on television seeking
treatment for Parkinsonism. Assault on Boxing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1984, at 18, col.
1. Dr. Richards noted that "[e]ven on TV it was apparent to me that he had some
kind of neurological damage." Id. Dr. David B. Homer, president of the California
Medical Association, similarly stated that boxing has "an extraordinary potential
for brain damage." Id. He concluded that "[tihe best way to reduce the risk of
serious brain injury or death in the ring is not to step into the ring at all." Id.
In 1984 the New York State Athletic Commission began a study of brain damage in 50 boxers. Katz, Brain Study on Knocked Out Fighters Under Way, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 16, 1984, at B18, col. 2. Although he initially did not discover evidence of
brain damage, Dr. Bennett M. Derby, Professor of Neurology at New York University noted that "[i]f you really want to know about dementia you probably have to
follow [the boxers] around for a quarter-century." Id.
13 See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
14 Four-Year, $1 Million Study To Be Done On Amateur Boxing, THE OLYMPIAN, at 44
(April 1985). The national governing body for Olympic amateur boxing, USA Amateur Boxing Federation (USA/ABF) contracted for the $1 million study which was
partially funded through a $320,383 grant from the U.S. Olympic Foundation. Id.
Walter Stewart, Ph.D., assistant professor of epidemiology at Johns Hopkins stated:
We plan to determine whether damage to the central nervous system
occurs and whether it is temporary or permanent. If abnormalities or
excessive risks are found, we want to know if they are more common
in boxers when compared to other athletes and to identify early warning signs of permanent injury.
Id.
15 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Robert 0. Voy, M.D., Director of the
USA/ABF's Division of Sports Medicine & Science, has attacked the AMA's position on boxing:
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of the AMA, Dr. Joseph R. Boyle noted that medical research indicates that acute and long-term brain injury results from even minimal exposure to boxing. 1 6 Accordingly, he encouraged physicians
to engage in a national effort to ban the sport.t7
In New Jersey, the safety concerns raised about boxing were at
least partially linked to the expansion of the industry in the state." In
1982, when boxing generated $8 million in television contracts and
$2.5 million in purses, the Governor's office conducted a boxing
safety seminar in Atlantic City."8 Commenting on the importance of
boxing to the state's economy, New Jersey Consumer Affairs Director, James Barry, stated that boxing is one of only a few industries in
the nation which has grown by more than 100% in one year.' 9
In 1983, however, New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean pointed
out that economic factors alone cannot take precedence over safety
and medical concerns. Governor Kean had commented that in recent years, New Jersey has become the boxing capital of the nation."° He maintained that New Jersey must be committed to
improving the safety of boxing within the state. 2 Based on these
concerns, and "[b]ecause of the urgency of assuring the physical
safety of boxers at a time when the demand for fighters is outpacing
the supply,' 2 2 the' SCI made the following minimum recommendations for medical improvements for boxing in New Jersey: pre-liBoxing and the AMA - when I hear those two words together it
brings to mind a picture similar to David and Goliath. Boxing, both
amateur and professional, is an imperfect but positive "little guy" in
our society while the American Medical Association is currently acting
like the big giant, throwing its weight around....
I have always questioned the logic of the ban. The thought immediately brings several key questions to mind: 1) will it eliminate or lead
to less injury; 2) haven't bans been historically counter productive and
unworkable in the long run? 3) is it in the best interests of the profession to dictate the rights of individuals to pursue whatever risks they
desire; and 4) is the action based on scientific fact and logic or emotion and personal taste?
Address of Robert 0. Voy, M.D., World Congress of Boxing Conference (May
1986) (available in the files of the Seton Hall Law Review).
16 Trumbull, AMA, Citing Danger, Asks Abolition of Boxing, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6,

1984, at AI, col. 4.
17 Id.
18 Weissman, Seminar Targets Safety In the Ring, Star-Ledger, Mar. 6, 1983, § 1, at
31, col. 1.
19 Id. New Jersey hosted 163 boxing matches in 1982, and state revenues from
boxing increased from $232,000 to over $440,000 in that year. Id.
20 Jenkins, Kean Stresses Safety At Seminar On Boxing, Star- Ledger Mar. 9, 1983,. at
33, col. 1.
21 Id.
22 SCI Interim Report, supra note 5, at 71.
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cense physicals; periodic physical examinations; pre-fight physicals;
standards for passing the pre-fight physical; urinalysis; post-fight
physical examinations; and mandatory suspensions. 23 These proposals were adopted and are discussed in Section III of this article.
Many of these proposals were not original. Indeed, the AMA
had made some of the same suggestions at congressional hearings
on boxing. 24 In a 1983 report to then Representative James J.
Florio (presently Governor of New Jersey), Neurosurgical Associ23 More specifically, the proposal reads as follows:

Pre-license physicals must be conducted only by an agency-designated physician. No fighter should be allowed into the ring unless this
examination has been conducted, the results of all tests have been
received and the physician has certified his fitness to participate. No
agency official should have the power to waive any medical requirements.
Periodicphysical examinations should be required in addition to the
less intensive pre-fight tests. Dr. Doggett has suggested in his testimony that these examinations be conducted every two years but in his
written proposals has recommended an annual test.
Pre-fight physicals should be conducted privately. The regulations
should be strengthened to buttress a physician's right to disqualify a
boxer for any medical reason.
Standards for passing the pre-fight physical should empower a physician to exclude a fighter who, although able to meet all customary
requirements of medical fitness, nonetheless appears unable to endure the physical stress of a contest. The examining doctor should
also have authority to exclude a fighter if he suspects drug use, particularly if circumstances do not enable him to resolve the issue prior to
the fight.
A urinalysis should be required to detect drug abuse among fighters in connection with the pre-fight physical. Since the technology apparently now exists to permit urine testing in a matter of minutes, a
system of random testing should at least be attempted.
Post-fight physical examinations: Fighters who have suffered knockouts and technical knockouts should be obligated to follow the instructions of agency physicians regarding post-fight medical
procedures such as checking into a hospital for observation or undergoing specified medical examinations, or suffer license suspension or
revocation. Medical suspension or revocation would be solely within
the discretion of the attending agency physician, subject to later review by the medical board.
Mandatory suspensions for specified periods of time following
knockouts or technical knockouts should be fixed by the medical
board. Such suspensions should remain in effect until an agency physician authorized reinstatement after conducting a complete physical
examination, including an EEG and, when indicated thereby, a CAT

Id.

scan.
24 See Hearings on H.R. 1778, supra note 3, at 43-80 (statements of Russel H. Patterson, Jr., M.D.; George D. Lundberg, M.D., on behalf of AMA; and Lonnie Hammargren, M.D., Neurosurgical Assoc. of Nev.). The AMA proposed that at
minimum, the following regulations should be enacted:
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ates of Nevada echoed the AMA's call for stricter medical monitor- that requirements for medical evaluations of boxers be upgraded, standardized and strictly enforced;
- that use of safety equipment, such as plastic safety mats and
padded corner posts, be mandated; and
- that all safety measures be applied to sparring partners.
Frequent medical training seminars should be conducted for all
ring personnel. We also recommend that the ring physician be authorized to stop any bout in progress, at any time, to examine a contestant and, when indicated, to terminate a bout that might, in the
physician's opinion, result in serious injury. Finally, to minimize the
severity of an injury that may occur we recommend that boxing bouts
not be permitted unless:
a) the contest is held in an area where adequate neurosurgical
facilities are immediately available for skilled emergency treatment of
an injured boxer;
b) advanced life support systems are available at ringside; and
c) a comprehensive evacuation plan for the removal of any seriously injured boxer to hospital facilities is ready.
Id. at 49-50.
At that time, the AMA was calling for reform of boxing. Its later decision to
call for a ban on boxing was based on its own study, see Lundberg, Boxing Should Be
Banned in Civilized Countries, 249 J. A.M.A 250 (January 14, 1983), as well as additional reports. See Ross, Cole, Thompson & Kyung, Boxers-Computed Tomography,
EEG, and NeurologicalEvaluation, 249 J. A.M.A. 211 (Jan. 14, 1983) [hereinafter Boxers-Computed Tomography]; Kaste, Vilkki, Sainio, Kuurne, Katevuo & Meurala Is
Chronic Brain Damage In Boxing A Hazard of The Past?,THE LANCET at 1186 (Nov. 27,
1982). A third report, adopted by the AMA, concluded that:
Boxing is a dangerous sport and can result in death or long-term
brain injury. However, other sports may also result in accidental death
or brain injury for participants.
Amateur boxing is fairly well supervised in this country through
several national organizations. Professional boxing is less well controlled since the supervision of the sport is carried out worldwide
through numerous uncoordinated national, state, and local boxing
commissions. Therefore, it is difficult to determine the medical chronology of injuries in boxers.
No reliable test exists to identify boxers at risk for sudden death
or impending brain injury. To reduce this risk, central administrative
regulations and strict medical supervision should be required for
boxing.
Brain Injury in Boxing, 249J. A.M.A. 254-256 (Jan. 14, 1983). One study noted that
during the last three years, 40 ex-boxers were examined to determine the effects of
boxing in regard to their neurological status and the computed tomographic (CT)
appearance of the brain. Thirty-eight of these patients had a CT scan of the brain,
and 24 had a complete neurological examination including an EEG. The results
demonstrate a significant relationship between the number of bouts fought and CT
changes indicating cerebral atrophy. Positive neurological findings were not significantly correlated with the number of bouts. Electroencephalographic abnormalities
were significantly correlated with the number of bouts fought. Computed tomography and EEG of the brain should be considered as part of a regular neurological
examination for active boxers and, if possible, before and after each match, to detect not only the effects of acute life-threatening brain trauma such as subdural
hematomas and brain hemorrhages, but the more subtle and debilitating long term
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ing of boxers emphasizing the need for federal regulation of
boxing.2 5 The World Boxing Council (WBC), a sanctioning body
for professional boxing matches, adopted mandatory medical examination requirements at its 1980 world convention in Mexico.2 6 The
changes of cerebral atrophy. See Boxers-Computed Tomography, supra, at 211. Another
report found that:
Three hundred and thirty-five deaths occurred among amateur
and professional boxers worldwide during the 35-year period between 1945 and 1979. Calculation of mortality rates for the sport is
imprecise, since the exact number of amateur and professional boxers
in the world is unknown. However, the fatality rate for boxing has
been calculated as 0.13 deaths per 1,000 participants. The following
are calculated fatality rates per 1,000 participants for other sports
during the same period: college football, 0.3; motorcycle racing, 0.7;
scuba diving, 1.1; mountaineering, 5.1; hang gliding, 5.6; sky diving,
12.3; and horse racing (jockeys and sulky drivers), 12.8. The advisory
panel had no information on how these statistics were compiled, and
cannot attest to their validity or reliability.
Brain Injury in Boxing, supra, at 255.
25 See Report from NeurologicalAssoc's. of Am. to Rep. James Florio (Feb. 15, 1983),
reprinted in Hearings on H. R. 1778, supra note 3, at 71. The report stated that boxing
should be federally regulated so that:
1) Medical information regarding the condition of boxers would
be quickly available in a standardized manner by computer to insure
that fight applicants are not under a medical restriction.
2) Research on the cause of boxing injuries would be greatly enhanced by the availability of the standardized information in the data
pool with the medical and ring history of the boxer. The federal authority to requisition information, such as the television tapes of a
fight, would allow scientific analysis of impact versus injury studies.
We could then be able to identify the most dangerous aspects of the
sport.
3) National standards would encourage the utilization of state of
the art electronic monitoring with instant computer read electroencephalograms. Medical monitoring can be adapted to protective
mouthpieces or even headgear between rounds to give immediate information on the cerebral status of boxers.
4) Standards can survive the political appointments variations of
local boards. This is especially true of states with infrequent bouts and
inactive, if any, medical advisory boards.
5) Uniform medical standards for the United States is the only
hope to counter the influence of special interest groups such as promoters, competing boxing associations, competing networks, and
even competing state commissions.
Id.
26 World Boxing Council Medical Safety Measures Taken in World Conventions (1975 to
1982), reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 1778, supra note 3, at 184. The WBC had instituted the following medical requirements:
Mandatory Medical Examination:
A. To extend boxing licenses.
B. Annual renewal of licenses.
C. After every knockout: 1) Catscan; 2) Neurological explora-
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broadcast industry has expressed similar concerns.2 7
tion; 3) Eye fondi; 4) EEG for comparison with prior EEG tests; 5)
Electro-nistamography.
D. To travel to fight outside with at least 4 weeks before a world
title fight: 1) Ophthalmology, perfect vision, eye fondi, campimentria;
2) Neurology, osteondinose reflexes, romberg, nistagemus; 3) Maxilar, teeth abnormalities to avoid inferior maxilar fractures; 4) Weight,
blood pressure, heart rate.
E. Eye examination before and after fights to boxers successfully operated for retina detachments and who have been authorized
to fight. The WBC does not favor a boxer with such operation to continue boxing.
F. Pre- and post-fight exams (during weigh-in and at dressing
rooms after every fight regardless of result).
G. Fat tissue lab exams for approval of boxers who object to
move up to heavier weights.
H. Medical supervision during training periods with a basic part
of such exams being the analytical control of weight, blood pressure,
heart rate, blood and urinalysis tests.
I. Any exam ordered by Commission doctors when necessary.
The above Medical Certificate must be presented plus updated
yearly exam to the Medical Board where the world title is to be
promoted.
Id. at 185. The WBC advocated Creation of the WBC Medical Card to require
medical examinations for issuing licenses to professional boxers. All boxers must
carry this and present it before fights, attached to other international passport. The
medical card would contain all relevant medical information. Boxers who fail to
comply are removed from the world ratings. Id. at 184.
27 Hearings on H.R. 1778, supra note 3, at 156 (prepared statement ofJames McKenna, Vice President and Director, Finance Planning CBS Sports). In 1983, CBS
Sports proposed the following outline for a Uniform Boxing Code:
1) Medical Approvals. Required medical approval, based on examinations, prior to the licensing of fighters. Examinations would include, but not necessarily be limited to, blood work, EKG's, CAT
scans and urinalysis. Specific medical approval, based on pre-fight examinations, would also be required before each fight. Boxers would
be certified at the specified weight - or near it - at the time contracts
for a fight are signed.
2) Suspensions. Automatic suspensions, universally recognized,
for 90 days for a fighter suffering a knockout, and 60 days for a fighter
after a TKO. A new medical exam would be required prior to the resumption of boxing.
3) PassportLicenses. Each licensed fighter would be issued a passport, which would have his medical history, list all of his fights and
have a picture and thumbprint or other means of positive identification.
4) Uniforn Ring Sizes. Each ring would be a minimum of 18'
square with a maximum of 20'. The apron would be a minimum of
two feet wide. There would be one course of ensulite padding underneath.
5) On-Site Medical Procedures. To include (a) providing doctors'
access to the ring at all times; (b) knowledge of the proximity and
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Corruption Issues

While most parties agree that medical and safety procedures
need to be strengthened and enforced, they differ considerably
regarding the degree of corruption in the industry. Several government investigations have revealed a pervasive influence by organized crime in the sport. In December 1985, the SCI noted
that:
Despite memory lapses that seemed to occur only when
interrogation touched on organized crime and despite a posture of childlike innocence, the testimony of hard-bitten promoters, managers, trainers and other boxing specialists before
the SCI corroborated the penetration of boxing in this state by
mobsters and mob associates. Although... the probe findings
offer no conclusive proof that any particular boxer is a mob
pawn or that organized crime has "fixed" prize fights, nonetheless the inquiry provides ample confirmation of underworld
28
intrusion.

quality of care available at the local hospital; (c) ambulances and
paramedical unit on hand.
6) Licensing. Standard licensing of managers, trainers and
promoters..
7) Standing 8 count.
8) Judging Standards. Uniform standards for judging a fight
including a 10-point must system.
9) Three Knockdown rule.
10) Standard length of time between rounds.
11) Reciprocity among states which have adopted the Code.
Id. at 160. The CBS Sports' proposal was developed as an alternative to H.R. 1778
and was designed to be implemented as a uniform statute. Id. at 158. McKenna
noted in his March 18, 1983 testimony that "CBS does not believe that such a Federal Commission is the appropriate means to regulating boxing. The proposed legislation would inject the federal government into an area which traditionally has
been left to the States." Id. at 154.
28 SCI Final Report, supra note 6, at 2-3. The report also stated that:
The SCI noted earlier the difficulties of achieving an effective exposure of organized crime's machinations. No intelligent reader
needs to be lectured about the sinister impact of the mob's strongarm
gluttony on various facets of the construction, shipping, trucking,
waste collection and other essential industries despite decades of investigations at every government level. Law enforcement monitoring
of organized crime's presence in boxing, however, has been sporadic
at best and mob interest in the sport since its revival in New Jersey as
a casino gaming industry promotional gimmick easily kept pace with
increased opportunities for profit, organized crime's life-blood. As
for the difficulty exposing organized crime's incursion into boxing in
this state, the SCI's record of executive session interrogations shows
that out of 70 witnesses who appeared to testify under subpoena, 17
exercised their Constitutional privilege to remain silent. Of those who
invoked their Fifth Amendment right, the Commission granted immu-
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Corruption and mismanagement, however, remain the major concerns to state boxing commissions, legislatures and the boxing
industry.
C. Administration Problems
The administration of the boxing industry is two-tiered. On
one level, state athletic commissions regulate the profession
within their respective jurisdictions. 9 On another level, various
governing bodies of the sport rank boxers within their organization and sanction boxing matches that involve title fights for the
organization's championship.
Generally, a state athletic commission is a statutorily-created
state agency which regulates a sport as designated by its charters.3 0 Occasionally, these commissions will regulate several related sports such as boxing, wrestling and the martial arts.3 '
These commissions are responsible for issuing boxing licenses
and often consider "personal conduct, character, physical condinity (after consultation with appropriate prosecutorial authorities) to
12, and testimony, much of it evasive, subsequently was extracted
from them.
Id. at 2.
The SCI's Executive Director, James J. Morley, testified in June 1985 before
the President's Commission on Organized Crime and stated that "[ojur Commission regards boxing as an extremely brutal sport. Perhaps this explains its attraction for organized crime as a money making vehicle. . . . [T]he SCI strongly
recommends that the federal government assume-in cooperation with the statesprimarily regulatory responsibility." President's Commission on Organized Crime at 12
(New York, June 25, 1985).
The federal government began to investigate the possible links between boxing and organized crime in the 1960's. In 1960, former Senator Estes Kefauver
held the first hearings on boxing reform. Senator Kefauver's concern was the criminal control of boxing. Underworld domination of professional boxing was the subject of extensive hearings before the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee
in June and December, 23 years ago .... A reading of the transcript demonstrates
significant evidence of a sport in disarray. Monopoly control, mismatches, poor
safety considerations for fighters, and fighter exploitation were all questions raised
in the 1960 hearings. Hearings on H.R. 1778, supra note 3, at 140 (statement of Rep.
Pat Williams).
29 In 1983, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce issued its recommendations on H.R. 2498, legislation designed to create the Congressional Advisory Commission on Boxing. House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Congressional
Advisory Comm'n on Boxing, H. R. REP. No. 188, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The
report noted that "43 states have athletic commissions which regulate both amateur
and professional boxing. Two states, Florida and Ohio, regulate boxing through
county commissioners. Five states, Georgia, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Wyoming,
and Colorado do not have any form of boxing regulations." Id. at 3.
30 BERRY AND WONG, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES, VOL. II,
§ 1.22-4, at 31 (1986).
31 Id.
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tion, criminal record, and (primarily for promoters) financial condition" before a license will be granted.32 In 1983, it was
estimated that there were approximately 5,000 licensed professional boxers in the United States who were governed by state
boxing regulations.3 3
Many authorities believe that the problems of professional
boxing in the United States are largely due to the varying degrees
of authority exerted by state athletic commissions. In a Congressional hearing, Representative Florio described the regulation of
boxing by individual states as a non-system. Each state determines the extent to which it will regulate boxing.34 This regulatory scheme has been allowed to function without federal
regulation because Congress has generally avoided regulating
sports which "have developed mechanisms which perform(] a
self-regulating function." '35 The problem with such a system is
that promoters who find one state's regulations too restrictive
move on to a more permissive environment."
In addition to concerns about the effectiveness of state athletic commissions, severe criticism has been leveled at the World
Boxing Association (WBA) and the United States Boxing Associ37
ation (USBA), two of professional boxing's sanctioning bodies.
Rarely are these competing governing organizations in agreement, since each organization believes its system is superior and
more effective than the other. In 1983,Jose Sulaiman, President
of the WBC, stated that "the WBC believes that we have the most
reliable voting system in the world today. The Ratings Committee consists of the leading, most recognized sports writers on five
continents, as well as a commission representative from each of
32 Id. The authors explain: "Because state athletic commissions are statutorily
created state agencies, they are considered to be acting under color of state action
and thus must meet constitutional requirements of due process." Id.
33 Brain Injury inBoxing, supra note 24, at 255. There are also approximately
15,000 ten to fifteen year olds who participate in the National Amateur Athletic
Union (AAU) Junior Olympic boxing program and 12,500 boxers who are involved
in the Golden Gloves Association of America program. Id. at 254.
34 Hearings on H.R. 1778, supra note 3, at 1. Many states do not even have such
statewide governing bodies. Id.
35 Id. The hearings revealed that "[w]ith the recent increase in television coverage of boxing events, boxing's nonsystem has been strained to the breaking point.
State authorities, unable to cope with the increase in the workload, have permitted
some fights to take place without thorough background checks and health examinations being completed .
Id. at 2.
36 Id.
37 Suggestions in the Searchfor Some Credible Bouts, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1982, § 5, at
2, col. 1.
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the five federations in the world."'3 8 In defending his organization, Sulaiman stated that the WBC must have a world-wide outlook and that, "[i]t [was his] very firm belief that it would be
unfair if one country undertook the responsibility for rating boxers throughout the world. The dangers in doing so are highly
3 9
evident."

The sanctioning groups have more than their quota of critics. Former world heavyweight champion Floyd Patterson has
testified that, "I would not like to see boxing abolished. I think if
you cleaned up some of the people outside the ring, like promoters, matchmakers, people that bring . . .bouts together, I think

you will have better fights." 4 ° Sig Rogich, Chairman of the Nevada State Athletic Commission, stated in 1983 that, "I have always advocated that the rating system should be taken out of the
hands of the organizations, the WBC and the WBA, for that matter the USBA .... I think that then you take it away from the

backrooms, you take it away from the general aspersions that
have come forth with regard to certain boxers being ranked and
others not being ranked."'"
D. Ethical Problems
Professional boxing has always had its share of unethical
promoters and managers willing to take advantage of uneducated
and naive boxers. As the AMA's Council Report noted, "[t]he
large sums of money involved in professional boxing encourage
accusations of fraud and corruption. 42 In Tilelli v. Christenbery,43
a New York court reached a similar conclusion:
The Legislature was plainly apprehensive of the unwholesome
influence exerted by gamblers, criminals and other disreputable persons who dominated professional boxing. Since it featured violence, the sport attracted full-blooded patrons who
38 Hearings on H.R. 1778, supra note 3, at 181 (prepared statement of Jose Sulaiman, President, World Boxing Council).
39 Id. at 182. At least one authority, broadcast analyst Howard Cosell, disagreed,
stating:
[Y]ou would find in short order that if we had our own national rating
system and if we paid no attention to them and created our own system for the development of world champions, you would find that the

WBC and the WBA would shortly perish. The WBA is ajoke to begin

with, with the WBC not much above it.
Id. at 15.
40

Id. at 16 (statement of Floyd Patterson, N.Y. State Athletic Comm'n).

41

Id. at 94 (statement of Sig Rogich, Chairman, Nev. State Athletic Comm'n).

42

Id. at 59 (citing Brain Injury in Boxing, supra note 24, at 255).

43

1 Misc. 2d 139, 120 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Spec. Term 1953).
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bet heavily on the outcome of the bouts. And... many were
not adverse to "fixing" fights at the behest of professional
gamblers.4 4
Many authorities agree that the major ethical problems in the
sport today stem from the "monopolistic" control by major promoters. This occurs when one promoter controls all the top fighters in
one weight classification and dictates the fighters, the location of the
event, and what broadcaster is granted the rights to telecast the
fight.
In 1986, for example, Tim Witherspoon was scheduled to defend his WBC heavyweight title against Tony Tubbs.4 5 When
Tubbs withdrew because of an alleged injury, Witherspoon's manager, Carl King, agreed that Witherspoon would fight James
"Bonecrusher" Smith.4 6 Don King, Carl King's father, promoted
the fight.4 7 Witherspoon lost his crown when Smith knocked him
out in the first round.4 8
Witherspoon had attempted to cancel the fight before his loss,
contending that Carl King was not authorized to agree to a switch of
opponents. 4 9 He was unsuccessful, however, because New York
regulations permit managers to effectuate such substitutions. It was
later revealed that Carl King was also a co-manager for Smith which
violated a New York State Athletic Commission rule barring managers from having two fighters on the same card without special permission.50 As New York state's Inspector General, Joseph A.
Spinelli queried, "Can a manager negotiate properly for his fighter
when he is also managing that fighter's opponent? And can the manager of both fighters negotiate properly on their behalf when the
promoter is a relative of his? These are some of the questions we
want to answer."'" New York State Athletic Commissioner Jose
Torres stated that, "[t]he Commission was never notified that Carl
52
King was involved in the management of Bonecrusher Smith."
Given the magnitude of the fight and Witherspoon's pre-fight objections, it is hard to fathom how such an important fact could be
overlooked.
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 143, 120 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
State Inquiry On Title Bout, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1986, at D9, col. 1.
Witherspoon Is Cleared On Tests, Boston Globe, Dec. 20, 1986, at 37, col. 1.
See supra note 45.
Id.
See supra note 46.
See supra note 45.

Id.
Id.
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Matters became more confused when Witherspoon was suspended from further competition when his post-fight urinalysis
exam tested positive for marijuana.5 3 The suspension was lifted a
few days later when Witherspoon demonstrated that a mixup had
occurred and that he had actually passed the test. 4 Torres announced that "[i]t was a clerical error. Somebody made a critical
error in putting 'positive' when it should have been 'negative'....
We made a mistake. Witherspoon passed both tests."'5 5 Witherspoon's response was that: "I knew this was going 56to happen (the
drug positive). Don King's trying to blackball me."
As a result of administrative errors in his office, New York State
Athletic Commission Chairman Jose Torres asked three of the Commission's employees to resign over the Witherspoon incident in January 1986. 57
III.
A.

NEW JERSEY'S ATTEMPT TO LEGISLATE BOXING REFORM

Impetus for Reform

As late as March 1983, there was little negative publicity
about boxing regulation in New Jersey. In the five years preceding 1984, the state had emerged as the "professional prize fighting capital of the nation."5 8 The number of boxing cards were at
an all-time high. Cable television had rediscovered the profitability of staging fights to fill programming time. Purses awarded for
59
fights were skyrocketing.
Symptomatic of a developing problem was the perception
that "[t]he state is very flexible in meeting the needs of the industry.... We like New Jersey because it's convenient, its boxing
commission is fair, it wants the exposure ....
" 6o Within weeks of
that statement, the first reports began to surface that the SCI was
probing the regulation of boxing in the state and paying particularly close attention to the relationship between promoters and
the state athletic commission. 6 '
See supra note 46.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.See also King Aloof In FinancialFuss, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1986, at D25, col.
53

4.
57 Berger, Boxing Changes Sought, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1987, at 47, col. 3.
58 Jersey Packs a Wallop, supra note 3.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 24 (statement of Don King Productions spokesperson).

61 Piserchia, SCI Studies Promotion of Atlantic City Boxing, Star Ledger, Mar. 22,
1983, at 21, col. 1.
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While the SCI's investigation may have focused public attenalready existed
tion on abuses in the system, a reform movement
within the state legislature. In January 1983, prior to the SCI's
involvement, the New Jersey Assembly. Independent Authorities
and Commissions Committee began to evaluate boxing reform
measures. 62 Initially, reform measures centered on medical and
safety issues but later expanded to embrace a whole spectrum of
boxing reform issues.63
The impetus for reform in New Jersey involved medical and
safety concerns over boxing. The committee chairman testified
about these subjects at Congressional hearings in 1983. 64 He
categorized three areas of concern: "Concerns regarding the
health of fighters before they step into the ring, .

.

. concerns

regard[ing] improved safety of fighters during a boxing match,
[and] . . .concerns . . . aimed at better organization of boxing
models in the industry as a whole."' 6 5 From the. testimony

presented in Congress, it was evident that many New Jersey state
legislators were worried that too much reform could stifle the resurgence of the boxing industry in the state. 66
Although segments of the federal bill covered safety concerns, the legislation ultimately introduced was much broader
than that originally contemplated during the hearings. This was
due, in part, to the abuses and irregularities of boxing regulations in New Jersey uncovered by the SCI investigation.67
B.

SCI Interim Report

The SCI Interim Report, 68 issued on March 1, 1984 to New
Jersey Governor Thomas Kean and the Legislature, focused primarily on the operation of the Office of State Athletic Commis62 See Public HearingBefore Assembly Independent Authorities and Commissions Committee
on the Promotion and Conduct of Boxing Matches in New Jersey (Jan. 19, 1983); Public
HearingBefore Assembly IndependentAuthorities and Commissions Committee on "Medical Examinations of Boxers" (July 27, 1983).
63 See Public Meeting before Assembly Independent and Regional Authorities Committee on
Testimony on Status of and Possible Reform to Boxing in the State of New Jersey (May 19,
1986).
64 Hearings on H.R. 1778, supra note 3, at 38-40.

65

Id.

Id. at 41.
See SCI Interim Report, supra note 5, at 3.
68 SCI Interim Report, supra note 5. SeeJersey State Panel Finds Inadequacies In Boxing
Controls, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1984, § 2, at B17, col. 5; Sullivan, Boxing CatchesJersey
Flat-Footed, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1984, at E6, col. 3.
66
67
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sion (OSAC) although it also addressed issues such as taxation

and medical safety. The introduction set the tone for the report:
So intense has become the demand for boxers that many
with even less than minimal physical and professional eligibility are crowding the fight scene throughout the state. As a result boxing contests no longer can be conducted in this state
without breaking the law at worst or bending the rules at best
- all at high cost to the integrity of the industry.6 9
The report characterized the OSAC, which New Jersey had established in 1931, as "a single-commissioner office to regulate the
conduct and taxation of professional and amateur boxing, wrestling
and 'sparring' exhibitions and performances." ' 70 Noting that the
OSAC Commissioner potentially wielded great power, the report
stated that "[h]is regulatory control is practically absolute and his
rule-making powers are restrained only by a requirement that they
be consistent with the OSAC statute."' 7 ' The operation of the
OSAC was complex and involved multiple tasks.
[It] overs[aw] professional boxing, amateur boxing and
professional wrestling. [It] ... license[d] all of the participants
... the matchmaker, the promoter, the seconds, the managers,
the boxers and doormen, the box office employees ....
[It]
review[ed] their applications ....
[It] collect[ed] a fee from
them, depending upon what they ha[d] applied for .... The
fees [were] set forth by [the] rules and regulations. . . . If
someone want[ed] to put on an amateur boxing event, they
first [had to] receive permission through the commissioner .... Once that [was] done [it] sent an inspector to col72
lect the taxes and assist the doctor in what he [had] to do.
The SCI concluded that the existing OSAC system was unable
to effectively regulate boxing in New Jersey, 73 noting that OSAC
regulations were routinely ignored.7 ' The most egregious violations were found in the area of licensing in which boxers and pro69 SC! Interim Report, supra note 5, at 1.
70

Id. at 3.

71 Id.
72

Id. at 4.

73 Id.
74 Id. at 5. The SCI noted in its interim report that:

[V]iolations of OSAC's regulations were and still are commonplace. Some rules are bypassed merely because OSAC believes they
serve no purpose or unduly inhibit accepted if inappropriate practices, others because of carelessness or failure to follow businesslike
procedures. As a result, licenses are issued on the basis of applications that are incomplete or falsified and permits to perform various
duties critical to the integrity of the sport are granted without ques-
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moters ignored even minimal standards.7 5 Beyond licensing, the
SCI was concerned about boxing's sanctioning bodies. 76 The SCI
feared that these groups (WBC, WBA, USBA, etc.) had failed to
carry out effectively their designated purposes such as establishing
weight classifications, setting minimum standards for rating fighters,
and keeping accurate records.7 7 Most disturbing, however, were the
interrelations between the prizefight sanctioning groups and various
state boxing regulators. 7" For example, the OSAC Deputy Commissioner also served as president of the USBA.79 In its interim report,
the SCI lambasted these sanctioning bodies and their so-called regulatory function. The SCI concluded that "the boxing organizations
... adversely affect state regulatory efforts," 8 and that since "[t]heir
rules take precedence over state law ... their relationships with state
agencies breed conflicts of interest."'"
The SCI Interim Report also raised concerns about the amounts
and methods of collecting tax revenues from boxing matches held in
New Jersey.8 2 The SCI noted that:
New Jersey's OSAC is not collecting gate and television
taxes in the manner and form required by its enabling law.
Some tax payments are illegally delayed. Improper "expense"
deductions are permitted which reduce tax revenues. False or
incomplete reports accompany some tax payments. The full
tion. Background inquiries, particularly criminal record checks, are
sparse and superficial if made at all.
Id.
75 Id. The SCI Interim Report stated that:

Lax licensing procedures have been a particularly flagrant example of inept administration. Even conceding the agency's personnel
limitations, the statutory and regulatory violations that are condoned
in order to assure that scheduled events take place are inexcusable.
Further, not even the most minimal modern business practices are
followed, such as establishing job qualifications, performance criteria
or personal conduct standards for the entire range of boxing activities
requiring licensure.
Id.
76

Id.

77
78

Id.
Id.

at

16.

79

80 Id. at
81 Id.

Id.

18.

82 Id. at 21. In 1984 the NewJersey admission tax on OSAC licensed events was
10%of the gross, except for championship bouts where the tax was lowered (as an
inducement to stage the bout in the state) to 5%. Id. at 23. In that year, NewJersey
also had a 5% tax on revenues received for the sale or lease of television on radio
tapes for transmissions received or exhibited in New Jersey. Id. at 26.
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tax rate imposed by statute is not enforced.8 3
The SCI also examined medical and safety problems within-the
sport, reasoning that "[n]o effort to promote the integrity and stability of professional boxing can make progress without reducing
the physical hazards to boxers. '"84 The SCI found regulatory deficiencies in the OSAC's implementation of safety and medical measures. It also found that the OSAC's frequent disregard of statutory
and regulatory requirements exhibited in other areas carried over to
safety and medical issues.8 5 The SCI identified an "ineffective enforcement system"" as a major problem. It blamed this ineffectiveness on a lack of manpower, a resulting failure to review record
keeping, to inspect training facilities and to identify the participants
in training sessions.8 7 The report also mentioned insufficient funding for thorough medical examinations 8 along with potential drug
use by boxers competing in matches 9 and the quality and profes9°
sionalism of many ringside support personnel, e.g., "cut men.
Finally, the SCI Interim Report documented numerous conflicts
of interest. 9' It observed that "the dialogue between the SCI and
the OSAC officials and licensees strongly suggests that ... the discretionary power of the boxing commissioner to permit exceptions
to ... the rules provides a particularly vulnerable area for misconduct." 9 2 The SCI noted that boxing promoters were making gifts to
OSAC officials, such as free hotel rooms and meals as well as financial donations to conventions for boxing groups that served the interests of OSAC officials.93
The SCI made a number of interim recommendations to the
governor and legislature while its investigation continued, hoping to
spur instant legislative re-structuring of OSAC. 94 The SCI recommended that:
control of all policy issues [be transferred] from a single administrator to a body of overseers who would determine the
operational pattern. A professional manager should be ap83

84
85
86

87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 60.
Id.

Id. at 65-66.
Id. at 68.
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pointed to implement policy decisions. Such an executive
must recognize that his primary obligation is not to promote
solely the economic aspects of boxing but to develop and
maintain its integrity as a professional sport.9 5
The SCI further recommended:
- retaining the revised operation within the Attorney Gen96
eral's jurisdiction;
financing the new operation from the revenues generated
97
from license fees and taxes;
- instituting controls so that regulations are not routinely by98
passed;
-

staffing; 99

95 Id. at 69.

96 The SCI reasoned:
The revised regulatory process should remain in the Attorney
General's department. However, it should have stronger legal guidance than in the past. As befits an agency attached to the state's chief
law enforcement officer, it should be motivated-prodded, if necessary -to enforce its own law and related regulations. If it is to remain
with the Division of Consumer Affairs, a much greater degree of managerial oversight must ensue than has been the practice.
Id.
97 d. The SCI stated:
The cost of administering an expanded regulatory program
should be paid out of the control agency's revenues from license fees
and taxes. The agency for the first time should have its own budget so
it can more effectively fulfill its fiscal requirements. Taxes and fees
should be collected in a timely fashion and to the full extent of the
law, with no exceptions, exemptions or other exclusions not permitted by law. If need be, taxes and fees should be increased to finance
certain medical safety proposals that the SCI believes are essential to
the welfare of boxers.
Id.
98 Id. The SCI advised:
A revised administrative process should eliminate certain questionable practices that have become part of its day-by-day conduct of
the sport. Instant licensing should be banned. No 1 th hour substitutions of boxers (or managers, seconds, etc.) should be permitted without prior confirmed qualification and identification. Rules requiring
advance notice of fight cards should be enforced rather than ignored
and should be buttressed by strong penalty provisions against
violations.
Id.
99 Id. The SCI stated:
Agency staff duties and responsibilities should be defined by
more effective personnel guidelines than now exist. Additional backup officials should be employed to maintain regulatory stability in
emergencies. Antiquated pay-scales must be replaced by more realistic compensation.
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record keeping;' 0 0
01
. taxation;

and
enfotcement of medical and safety regulations;'
conflicts
of
ethics
to
govern
of
a
strict
code
establishment
03
of interests.'
Id. at 70. The SCI stressed:
New Jersey should set an example for computerized recordkeeping, particularly on boxers who are state residents or to whom the
agency has otherwise easy access. No boxer, from any state, should be
permitted to fight without complying with requirements for advance
submission of his career record, medical data, and personal background that determine his eligibility. As noted earlier in this report,
federal registration of boxers may be the only appropriate solution to
the sport's recordkeeping chaos.
101 Id. The SCI reasoned: "Various classes of taxation should be eliminated,"
and not be on any sliding scale based on the perceived importance of a fight. In
addition, the SCI called for "[a] collection system to assure the integrity and timeliness of the tax collection... " Id.
102 Id. With respect to medical and safety concerns, the SCI stated:
The SCI subscribes to lawmaker Schuber's proposal to establish a
medical board. However, such a board should have more than only an
advisory responsibility. Its rulings should have the force of law. In
matters involving complex medical issues, no regulatory official
should have the discretionary authority to dismiss the expert judgment of medical professionals. As this report has demonstrated, safety
precautions have frequently been skirted in efforts to make boxing in
New Jersey more lucrative to promoters. A truly effective medical
board should have the authority to promulgate regulations defining
not only the scope of physical examinations but also the standards for
passing them. Members of such a board would, of course, include specialists in cardiology, neurosurgery, orthopedics and ophthalmology.
Id.
103 Id. at 72. The SCI explained:
There may be good reasons why a NewJersey boxing representative should be a member of one or more of the national or international sanctioning bodies. Nonetheless, their purposes and interests
are so at odds with those of the state's regulatory system as to require
an absolute prohibition on officeholding in such organizations by any
agency official or employee.
The sanctioning bodies should not be allowed any role whatsoever in the selection of ring officials for exhibitions in New Jersey.
Similarly, no control agency regulation should ever be modified or
waived to conform with a conflicting provision of a sanctioning body.
Compensation to all agency licensed officials including judges,
referees and timekeepers, should be paid directly by the agency.
Agency-licensed doormen and box office employees should be appointed by the agency rather than by a casino or other party against
whom state gate taxes are to be assessed.
Lastly, OSAC must adopt a strict code of ethics, including a provision barring its officials and employees from accepting :free meals,
rooms or other gratuities from promoters or other licensees or any
other entity participating in the sponsoring of an event. Also, officials,
employees and appointees and their families (spouses, parents, chil100
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The legislature's reaction to the SCI Interim Report was generally
positive. 14 The Committee Chairman agreed with many of the
SCI's recommendations and indicated that he favored the New York
model of "a body of overseers rather than a single commissioner. ' 05 He noted that financing a new regulatory body would
be very important since without sufficient funding, stringent rulemaking and safety standards would not be enforceable.' °6 He further emphasized that:
If we are to prevent the injury-producing mismatches
caused by last-minute substitution on fight cards, if we are to
prevent the injury-producing neglect and inadequacy that
often characterize medical examinations; and if we are to prevent our boxing industry from becoming a show, then we must
provide our commission with adequate numbers of personnel
07
to enforce the regulations we all agree are necessary.'
In enacting new procedures, the Chairman explained that no weight
should be given to the economic impact of regulation or the number
of fights which would be held in the state.'0 8
The SCI Interim Report, in contrast to the final report, was
praised as a thorough review of the state of the boxing industry in
NewJersey. One editorial provided that "[t]he SCI has conducted a
useful investigation that brings to light a deplorable situation that
might not otherwise have attracted public attention. As for the fight
game, it should clean up its act voluntarily without waiting for regulatory reform."' ° 9 It was now up to the legislature to revamp the
dren) should be barred from having any financial interest or contractual relationship with any person or entity operating in a capacity
subject to licensure by the agency.
Id.
104 See Assembly Majority News (Mar. 21, 1984). The statement noted that "the
Chairman of the Assembly committee which acts on legislation regulating boxing in
New Jersey said he welcomes the State Commission of Investigation's recommendations as a ringing endorsements 'for the changes I have sought in order to give
New Jersey a healthy and honest fight industry.' " Id.

105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.

at 2.

Id.
109 Sucker Punch, Star Ledger, Mar. 23, 1984, at 20, col. 1. Not all reactions to the
SCI's report as proposed legislation were favorable. Dan Duva, promoter for Main
Event, stated:
The state put the commission in this position. They don't give the
commission the money and the staff, then they criticize the commission.
Boxing is the traditional whipping boy of politicians. Why? Be108
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regulatory system for professional boxing in New Jersey.,
C.

887
10

Initial Legislative Proposals and Enactments

In 1984 Assemblyman Fortunato, Chairman of the Independent Authorities and Commissions Committee, introduced
two bills addressing boxing reform."' The first bill mandated
the development of a new regulatory body, the State Athletic

Control Board (SACB), consisting of three members appointed
by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate.'l 2 The members
would have power to "exercise sole discretion, management,
control and supervision over all public boxing."' 15 SACB was
empowered to appoint all necessary deputy commissioners, inin orspectors, judges, referees, physicians, and other personnel
14
der to effectively regulate boxing in New Jersey."
In addition, the board and all its employees were prohibited
from (1) accepting gratuities from members of the boxing industry,' 15 (2) gambling in any of New Jersey's casinos,' 1 6 (3) ruling
on any action before the board involving a spouse or other family
member," 7 and (4) having any direct financial or other business
interest with any boxer, promoter or other individual regulated
by the board."'
cause of the stereotypes that it involves the lower socio-economic
classes and because it doesn't have the prestige.
There are just as many knockouts in a football game as in boxing.
A football player gets knocked cold in the first quarter of a game. He
gets revived and comes back in the third quarter. He has suffered a
concussion. But is that regulated? No.
Could you imagine if a politician said a football player that was
knocked out had to be suspended for 60 days, which is the rule for
boxing. Can you imagine the grief that politicians would receive?
Bontempo, Politicians Repeat Boxing People With Legislation Call, Atlantic City Press,
Apr. 3, 1984, at 21, 30, col. 1.
110 The OSAC attempted internal reform after the release of the SCI Interim Report although its efforts came too late to avoid legislative scrutiny. In December
1984 (six months after issuance of the SCI Interim Report) the OSAC proposed extensive changes in its regulatory system for boxing, especially in relation to health
and safety issues. Piserchia, State Seeks to Ensure Boxers' Safety, Health, Star Ledger,
Sept. 2, 1984, § 1, at 24, col. 1.
II See A. 2353, 201st Leg., 1st Sess. (July 30, 1984); A. 2468, 201st Leg., 1st Sess
(Sept. 20, 1984).
112 A. 2353 § 3a.
113 Id. § 4.
'14 Id. § 5b & c.
'15 Id. §6a.
116 Id. §6b.
'17 Id. § 6c. & d.
118 Id. § 6e.
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The bill also established New Jersey's first State Athletic
Control Board Medical Advisory Council empowered to develop
"regulations, rules and standards of examinations" necessary to
protect boxers' physical welfare" 9 and to develop a medical education program for physicians employed by the board.' 20 It was
also charged with reviewing annually the credentials and performances of physicians employed by the board 12 ' and with advising the board on "any study of equipment, procedures- or
personnel

which

[would]

promote

the

safety

of

participants." 122
The legislation also instituted strict new licensing procedures for "promoters, boxers, . .. their managers, scorers and
trainers [and] ... any officials.123 No individual without a license

could conduct or perform in a boxing match in the state. 124 The
legislation granted the board wide powers for reviewing and investigating all licenses. 125 Under its investigative powers, the
board could examine individuals under oath, 126 subpoena witnesses or records, 127 suspend licenses through the Attorney General's office,'12 grant immunity,' 29 and levy civil penalties for
violations. 130 The board was under the mandate that no license
should be granted to individuals, "who do not possess good
character, honesty, integrity and responsibility."''3
Under the legislation, all licensed boxers would be required
to carry a passport book containing "an accurate history of all
matches that the boxer has engaged in since becoming a professional ....

the matches won and lost and the matches in which

there was a technical knockout or a knockout."' 132 Boxers who
did not comply with the mandate faced the possibility of having
119 Id. § 8b. The Medical Advisory Council would have seven members appointed
by the Governor and would represent the fields of dentistry, cardiology, neurology,
ophthalmology and orthopedics. Id. § 8a.
120 Id. § 8c.
121 Id. § 8d.
122

Id. § 8f.

123
124

Id. § 14a.

Id. § 14b.

125

Id. § 9.

126
127

Id. § 9c.
Id.

128

Id. § 9e.
Id. § 10.

129
130

Id. § 11. The board could levy a "civil penalty of not less than $250 and not
more than $25,000 for the first offense and not less than $500 and not more than
$50,000 for the second and each subsequent offense." Id.
131 Id. § 15a.
132 Id. § 15f.
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their licenses suspended after a hearing.'3 The bill also required all promoters to obtain a permit from the SACB before
staging a match or selling admission to a closed circuit telecast or
radio broadcast of a boxing event and further mandated that the
board be notified of any transmission of a boxing match originat3 4
ing in New Jersey.
Strict provisions, designed to enforce the collection of tax
monies owed to the state, required box office reports for all ticket
sales and complimentary ticket distributions. 1 5 The Attorney
13 6
General's office would prosecute any non-payments.
Finally, the legislation mandated:
the board to study the use of thumbless gloves as a safety
3 7
precaution;
judges to score boxing matches at the end of each round of
the fight and report
the scores to the board's representative
38
at the match;'
promoters to have no financial dealings with the manager
or boxer9 who was participating in the promoter's boxing
3
event;1
140
officials to take no cash payments at boxing matches;
the establishment of a "New Jersey Commission to Study
Benefits to be Provided To Professional
Boxers" to study
14 1
possible pension plans for boxers; and
the board to conduct inspections of training facilities in the
-

state. 142
The General Assembly approved this legislation on December
6, 1984, by a unanimous vote, 143 and two months later the New
Jersey Senate voted its approval.1 44 Governor Thomas Kean signed
the measure into law on March 15, 1985.141
Moving through the legislature during the same period was As'33

Id.

134
15

Id. § 18a-c.
Id. §§ 19a-d and 20a & b.

136

Id.

137

Id. § 25.
Id. § 26.
Id. § 27.

138
139
140

141
142

§ 20e.

§ 28.
Id. § 30.
Id. § 29.
Id.

143 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:2A-1 (West 1988); see Piserchia, Sweeping Reforms For The
Boxing Industry Sail Through the Assembly, Star Ledger, Dec. 7, 1984, at 47, col. 1.
144 72 N.J. Leg. Index A55 (1984-1985).
145 Id. See 1985 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 83 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:2A-1 to 31 (West 1988)).
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semblyman Fortunato's second piece of legislation. 1 46 This bill was
designed to make New Jersey's tax on boxing matches more competitive with other states, notably Nevada and New York, so that
New Jersey could attract more lucrative and prestigious title
fights.' 4 7 Before enactment of the legislation, New Jersey taxed the
sale of tickets to boxing matches at five to ten percent of gross
re48
ceipts depending upon whether the match was a title bout.1
Fortunato contended that New Jersey was not attracting more
title bouts because the promoters "were being taxed to the point
where they were losing money by promoting fights in New
Jersey." 149 The bill changed the formula, taxing box office receipts
on a sliding scale starting with three percent on the first $25,000,
four percent on the next $50,000, five percent on the next
$125,000, six percent on any amount exceeding $200,000, with no
50
match being assessed more than $100,000 in gross receipts taxes.1
The tax on televised bouts was also revised by taxing ticket sales at
five percent for the first $50,000 in ticket sales, three percent for the
next $100,000, two percent for the next $100,000 and one percent
T
for any amount in excess of $250,000. 15I
The SCI was asked to assess the impact of the Fortunato bill on
tax revenues as well as that of its companion bill, introduced in the
Senate by Senator Richard J. Codey. 15 2 The SCI was particularly
concerned with how the reduction of tax revenues would affect the
funding of the SACB.' 5 3
See supra note 111.
Piserchia, Title Bout Lure Goes To Kean, Star Ledger, Dec. 7, 1984, at 47, col. 6.
See also Note, Boxing, Wrestling, and Combative Sports, 10 SETON HALL LEG. J. 327, 32930 (1987).
148 1984 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 248, at 504 (Assembly Revenue, Finance and Appropriations Committee statement).
149 See supra note 147.
150 See supra note 111.
151 Id.
152 Letter from Arthur S. Lane, Chairman, State of New Jersey Commission of
Investigation to Hon. Richard J. Codey and Hon. Buddy Fortunato (Oct. 9, 1984)
(discussing Senate No. 2184, Assembly No. 2468) (available in the files of the Seton
Hall Law Review).
153 Id. Chairman Lane noted in his correspondence that:
In regard to the rate schedule for live gate revenues, the amendment would result in a 70% reduction in revenue from most events
held in this state. And, while tickets to these events are not subject to
the general sales tax (N.J.S.A. 54:32B-3), ticket sales grossing up to
$200,00 would be taxed at less than the 6% general sales tax rate.
Furthermore, the rates under this schedule would be substantially less
than the average of the rates imposed in other major boxing states,
according to a 1983 survey conducted by Deputy Commissioner Lee.
The rate schedule for broadcast revenues is identical to that proposed
146
147
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The General Assembly passed the second Fortunato bill on November 19, 1984 by a vote of 72-2"5 and the Senate approved it on
December 6, 1984, without debate, by a 32-1 vote.' 5 5 Governor
Thomas Kean signed the measure into law on January 7, 1985.156
Since its implementation, promoters have criticized the legisla-7
5
tion for taxing revenues from ticket sales in out-of-state venues.'
As one author noted, "if ninety percent (90%) of the spectators are
viewing the event from outside the state limits, then only ten percent (10%) of the broadcast revenues should be taxable under the
58
law."1

D.

Investigative Probes of Boxing
While the New Jersey Legislature was enacting regulatory reforms, the SCI continued to probe the boxing industry within the
state. The SCI probe ran parallel to efforts by the New Jersey
State Police, the Attorney General's Division of Gaming Enforcement, and federal criminal investigators who were also interested
in boxing's ties to organized crime.' 59 Then-Deputy Superintendent of the New Jersey State Police, Lt. Col. Justin Dentino, believed that criminal elements were present in the state's boxing
industry. Dentino noted that, "[w]e've been keeping close tabs
on the situation for more than a year now and if one thing is for

certain, organized crime is involved."' 60 James Flanagan, Deputy
Director of the Division of Gaming Enforcement (DGE) noted
that, "[d]uring the course of our investigation we have discovered some questionable associations involving promoters."''
The boxing promoters vigorously denounced these charges.
by Mr. Lee as a result of the 1983 survey and was apparently designed
to put New Jersey in a position to compete with other states. Due to
the confusing language of the present statute and the unorthodox
manner in which it was enforced, it is impossible to make any useful
comparison with the proposed schedule.
Id.
154 72 New Jersey Leg. Index A57 (1984-1985).
155
156

Id.

Id. See Taxation - Boxing, Wrestling, and SparringExhibits and Performances, 1984
STAT. ANN. §§ 5:2A-1 to - 31 (West
1988)). The Act became effective on January 7, 1985. Id.
157 See Piserchia, supra note 147, at 330.

N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 248 (West) (codified at N.J.
158

Id.

159 Piserchia, State Spars with Boxing Industry On Mob Ties to Boardwalk Fights, Star
Ledger, Apr. 22, 1984, § 1, at 1, 24, col. 1.
160 Id. See also Rudolph & Piserchia, U.S. Probing Graft In New Jersey Boxing, Star
Ledger, Jun. 23, 1984, at 1, 4, col. 4; Inquiry Reported On Jersey Boxing, N.Y. Times,
Jun. 9, 1984, at C5, col. 1.
161 See supra note 159, at 24.
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Bob Arum of Top Rank, Inc. charged that "[t]hey say, they have
numerous examples of prominent boxing promoters consorting
with known organized crime figures. We are the prominent promoters; we are the ones the world sees on national television
from Atlantic City and we are challenging them to name
16 2
names."
During the SCI's investigations, the New Jersey boxing community was embroiled in a controversy involving one of its long
time regulators, Robert W. Lee. 163 In its interim report, the SCI
raised questions concerning the propriety of Lee serving as both
Deputy Commissioner of the OSAC and as president of the
USBA, a boxing sanctioning group that Lee was supposed to regulate in his state position. 64 Further investigation of this dual
position led to Lee's dismissal from the state regulatory agency.
Initially, Lee was slated to succeed to the position of state
athletic commissioner when that position opened in February
1984 upon "Jersey Joe" Walcott's resignation. 16 5
Governor
Kean nominated Lee for the commissioner's position which he
assumed in an acting capacity while the Senate considered his
permanent confirmation.' 6 6 This all occurred before the SCI Interim Report was issued. In March 1984, however, the New Jersey
Executive Committee on Ethical Standards began an investigation of the SCI's conflict-of-interest accusations and other
charges including:
alleged payment of expenses for trips taken by Deputy
Commissioner Lee by promoter Butch Lewis;
improper use of complimentary tickets; and,
improper deductions which Lee allowed promoters to
16 7
take on gross television revenues.
The New Jersey ethics law prohibits state officials from accepting directly or indirectly, "any gift, favor, service, or other
thing of value" from anyone offering it with the intent to influence that official. 168 In addition to prohibiting gifts, the law also
forbids officials from having "any interest, financial or otherwise,
162 Sterling & Jenkins, Fight Promoters Counter State On Mob Claims, Star Ledger,
Apr. 27, 1984, at 1, 16, col. 1.
163 Id.
164 Piserchia, Acting Boxing Chief Admits 'Election' Gifts Amid Ethics Probe, Star
Ledger, Jun. 28, 1984, at 21, col. 1.
165 SCI Interim Report, supra note 5, at 18.
166 Nomination Criticized, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1984, at A46, col. 4.
167 See Piseichia, supra note 159, at 24.
168 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13D-23(e)(6) (West Cum. Supp. 1989).
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direct or indirect, or engag[ing] in any business or transaction or
professional activity, which is in substantial conflict with the
69
proper discharge of his [or her] duties in the public interest.',
In June 1984, Lee admitted that he had accepted contributions from individuals for the president's post of the WBA and
70
for his unsuccessful attempt at winning the USBA presidency.
On July 9, 1984, the Attorney General's office assumed the daily
operations of the State Athletic Commissioner's Office pending
7
the outcome of the various state and federal investigations.' '
On August 15, 1984, the Ethics Commission charged Lee with
nine counts of state ethics violations. 72 Governor Kean withdrew Lee's nomination for the post of commissioner on August
16, stating that, "I do not intend to submit a nomination7 to the
Senate until the charges against Mr. Lee are resolved."' 1
On October 3, 1984, the Executive Commission on Ethical
Standards sent the charges filed against Lee to the Office of Ad'ministrative Law for a hearing. 74 In December 1984, investigaof the
tors determined that the evidence supporting several
1 75
charges against Lee were insufficient to press charges.
Nearly one year later, Lee, who was still serving as acting
169

Id. § 52:130-23(e)(1).

170 Jersey's Law Office Takes Over Boxing, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1984, at BI0, col. 5.
171 Id.
172 Katz, Ethics Panel Acts In Lee Case, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1984, at B19, col. 4.
The charges that were announced against Lee included that the Commissioner:
1. Accepted money from Don King at a 1982 WBA function.
2. Accepted contributions of $5,000 each from promoters
Butch Lewis and Dan Duva for WBA president's campaign.
3. Accepted additional contribution from Duva, Lewis and Russel Peltz at 1982 WBA convention.
4. Accepted $6,700 photocopying machine from promoter Bob
Arum for IBF headquarters in Newark.
5. Accepted $4,400 contribution from Don King for IBF function.
6. Accepted $1,470 contribution from Butch Lewis for IBF
function.
7. Solicited funds for IBF function from promoter Lou Falligno.
8. Solicited and accepted $14,000 loan from Butch Lewis for
the IBF.
9. Solicited Atlantic City Casinos and other promoters for other
contributions.
Id. See also Katz, Jersey Ethics Inquiry Faults Boxing Aide, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1984, at
A19, 22, col. 1.
173 Katz, Ethics PanelActs in Lee Case, supra note 172, at B19, col. 4.
174 Piserchia, Ethics Panel Forwards Case Against Athletic Chief, Star Ledger, Oct. 4,
1984, at 44, col. 3.
175 Piserchia, Ethics Probers Decline To Charge State Boxing Officer On Fund-Raiser,Star
Ledger, Dec. 25, 1984, at 40, col. 2.
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commissioner, was given a one-month suspension and fined $600
for the remaining ethics violations. 7 6 Administrative Law Judge
David Mowyek found that Lee committed six violations of the
ethics code, 177 and gave Lee the option of either resigning his
post with the state or with the USBA. 178 Lee opted to resign his
state post and Governor Kean promptly appointed Larry Hazzard to succeed him.' 7 9 Hazzard assumed his duties as acting
commissioner on December 2, 1985, and was sworn in on February 2, 1986.180
E. Final SCI Report
Following the issuance of the Interim SCI Report, the new
SACB attempted to reform New Jersey's boxing operations. In
January and June of 1985 the SACB, under direction of the Attorney General's office, issued regulations tightening safety and
licensing standards.' 8 ' According to the Attorney General, the
safety reforms exceeded "the recommendations made by the SCI
and also completely revised the regulations dealing with the ring
and boxing equipment."' 182 The regulations required pre-fight
and post-fight physicals and increased the ringside physician's
authority over equipment and stopping a fight based on medical
concerns.

183

The new regulations required boxers to furnish proof of age
18 4
and/or identity in order to be licensed to fight in New Jersey.
In addition, the regulations required boxer-manager contracts be
filed with the Athletic Commission. 8 5 Further, ethical standards
were instituted to avoid conflicts of interests, such as restrictions
on promoters and their family members from having any financial interests in an athlete. 8 6 The SACB's efforts, however, were
176 Lee Suspended, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1985, at A18, col. 1; See also Piserchia,
Ethics Vote On Lee Is Questioned, Star Ledger, Aug. 23, 1985, at 20, col. 3.
177 In the Matter of Robert W. Lee, Acting State Athletic Commissioner, Office of Administrative Law, Docket No. ETH 7895-84 (ul. 26, 1985).
178

Id.

Piserchia, Larry Hazard Named Acting State Athletic Chief, Star Ledger, Nov. 27,
1985, at 26, col. 2.
180 Interview with State Athletic Control Board, Trenton, New Jersey (Oct. 1,
1987).
181 Schwaneberg, Jersey Takes Offense With 'Most Comprehensive' Boxing Reforms, Star
Ledger, June 20, 1985, at 40, col. 1.
179

182

Id.

183

Id.

184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
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not enough to dent the criticism that the SCI would deliver in its
final report.
After concluding its investigation, the SCI issued its final report on May 1, 1984, entitled Organized Crime in Boxing-FinalBoxing Report of the State of New Jersey Commission of Investigation.'8 7 As
the title suggests, the report focused heavily on the SCI's perception that organized crime had deeply penetrated the operation of
boxing within the state.'8 8
The SCI's report created controversy not only because of its
view on organized crime, but more so because the SCI advocated
the abolition of boxing as a sport.' 89 The SCI stated that "[t]he
presence of organized crime in boxing . . .warrants aggressive
official reaction .... [N]o human endeavor so brutal, so suscepti-

ble to fraud and so generally degrading should be accorded any
societal standing."' 90 The SCI argued that "a further assessment
of the industry has convinced the Commission that... the inherent problems of professional boxing-and most particularly its
constant threat of bodily destruction, mentally and physically' 91
cannot be effectively resolved at any governmental level."'
The SCI identified several factors influencing its decision.
These included the risk of brain damage, 92 the AMA's call for a
ban on boxing,193 and the underlying concern that intentional in187

SCI Final Report, supra note 6.

188 Id. at
189 Id.

3.

190 Id.
191 Id. at 127.
192 Id. SCI stated that:
Perhaps the single most pivotal factor in the Commission's determination that boxing should be abolished is its investigative conclusion that not even the sturdiest of statutory controls will reduce the
brutality of the sport to any significant degree. In addition, the Commission believes that no truly viable social or economic benefits can
be derived from such legal savagery. Too many boxers retire as physical or mental derelicts. Indeed, the long-term brain damage caused by
hundreds of blows to the head has been verified by numerous authoritative medical studies. As a result, the most renowned specialists have
publicly urged either that boxing be permitted only if cerebral attacks
can be prevented (which is improbable) or that the sport be outlawed
in totality. George Vecsey of the New York Times several years ago
questioned the moral and social validity of boxing as a sport in a column about a title bout that was so lopsided that he portrayed the defeated boxer as the victim of a "sanctioned mugging." Vecsey's
conclusions on that occasion coincide with the Commission's views.
Id.
193 Id. at 128. The SCI viewed the AMA call for a ban on boxing as significant.
The SCI report noted that "[t]he American Medical Association has been in the
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jury was the objective of those who participated in the sport."9
The SCI concluded that none of the "arguments put forth by
proponents of boxing have effectively countered the factor most
pivotal in shaping the Commission's call for abolition-the certainty of critical brain and/or visual damage."' 9
In the event boxing was not banned, the SCI provided alternate recommendations including the following:
1. no sanctioning body;
2. background checks of all state licensed positions;
3. casino vendor licensure;
4. enforce licensing requirements;
5. medical council powers;
6. ban head blows;
7. require headgear;
8. require safer gloves;
9. ambulance availability;
10. medical insurance;
11. two physicians at ringside;
12. post-fight examinations; and
13. time lapse between bouts
(30 day minimum, 60 days in
96
cases of knockouts). 1
The SCI stated that such "[a]lternative recommendations are
submitted with the admonition that they should be swiftly enacted
or promulgated, strictly enforced and be kept free of exceptions and
other efforts to compromise their objectives. '"97 The SCI doubted,
however, that any regulation could be effective in the boxing profes98
sion without federal regulation.
The SCI's call for a ban on boxing received a predictably cool
response. Dan Duva, one of the leading boxing promoters in New
Jersey, contested alleged links between boxing and organized crime.
Duva swore that "no individual or group of individuals allegedly
linked to organized crime has exerted any influence whatsoever over
the conduct of professional boxing in New Jersey."' 9 9 Bob Arum
labeled the SCI's final report as "McCarthyism" and stated that,
forefront of the campaign to abolish boxing ever since the 1982 ring-injury death of
Korean boxer Duk Koo Kim. The Journalof the American Medical Association first urged
a nationwide ban in January, 1983, in an editorial which also suggested the potential problem of enforcing a prohibition of the sport." Id.
194

Id. at 129.

195 Id. at 130-31.
196
197

Id. at 131-34.
Id. at 131.

198 Id.
199 Thomas,Jersey Boxing Ban Criticized, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1985, at B27, col. 1.
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"[i]n all the years we've been in business we've never.., had any
contact with organized crime figures. ' 20 0 Lee, who was previously
removed from the Athletic Commission but who retained his role as
president of the International Boxing Federation, asserted that a
ban on boxing would "drive the sport underground where there
would be no controls."' 20 1 Jose Torres, was particularly critical of
the SCI's conclusions and alleged that "the reports [were] done su20 2
perficially ... just to get some publicity.The media reacted to the SCI's call for a ban on boxing as
overly extensive and pre-mature. Experts agreed that boxing
needed reform, but believed that a ban should only be considered if
reform measures failed. An editorial response from WOR-TV in
New Jersey stated that:
The commission insists that in addition to subjecting fighters
to brain damage and possible death, the boxing world is inhabited by underworld figures. And no matter how stringently
the state tries to regulate the industry, organized crime stays
firmly entrenched. So, the commission's answer is ban professional boxing. They may be right. But, we believe professional
boxing deserves a chance to clean up its act. Last year, some
fairly comprehensive reforms became law in New Jersey. We
believe more time is needed to test their effectiveness ....203
200

Id.

Id. Marvin Kohn, a deputy New York State Athletic Commissioner, noted that
a study of boxing in New York State during 1917-20, when boxing was banned in
the state, indicated that 34 boxers died during that time span from participating in
unsupervised, illegal bouts. Id. Bob Arum, Chairman of Top Rank, Inc., has stated
that:
The abolition of boxing may even be dangerous. After all, in boxing, contestants are of a comparable weight. If aggressive kids go out
and fight each other on an unsupervised basis, the extent of injuries
can be greater. In certain Latin countries, where amateur boxing programs aren't strong, kids go to the beach and punch the hell out of
each other. At least in boxing, there is discipline and strict training.
Report on the Seventh International Sport Summit, "Status Report: Boxing-AMA vs. Top
Rank-The Great Debate-Should Boxing Be Outlawed?" New York, New York (1985).
202 Torres Criticizes Jersey Study, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1985, at D23, col. 4.
203 Don't Ban Boxing Yet, E-572, WOR-TV Editorial, Secaucus, N.J. (Jan. 9-15,
1986). The editorial further stated that:
The safety of the fighters must be our first priority. Thumbless
gloves are being tested in New Jersey now. We'd like to see protective
headgear used too. Headgear won't prevent a well-placed knock-out
punch. But it may help protect against the kind of repetitious blows
that cause a fighter to end up "punchdrunk." And we want even
stronger rules to prevent the kind of mismatches that can do so much
physical damage.
We believe the emphasis in professional fights must be shifted
from knockout power, to style, form and points. If that causes fight
201
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Further New Jersey Legislative Proposalsfor Control and Reform of
Boxing

On March 6, 1986 Assemblyman Schuber introduced A.
2204, An Act Concerning Boxing, Wrestling, Kick Boxing and the Combative Sports. 2 04 The bill was designed to implement "the recommendations of the SCI concerning boxing in the State, and apply
those recommendations to kick boxing, combative sports, and
25
wrestling.
Schuber's new legislation was aimed at enhancing safety and
addressing the ethical concerns raised by the SCI. The bill defined the role of the State Athletic Control Board Medical Advisory Council and recommended regulations and standards for
the medical examination of all boxing participants.2 °6 Those recommendations included pre-fight and post-fight examinations,
periodic comprehensive examinations and an extensive medical
examination prior to the issuance or renewal of any licenses.2 °7
The legislation envisioned the Council advising the Athletic
Board on "equipment, procedures or personnel which [would]
20 8
. . promote the safety of participants.1
Schuber's bill also required: (1) two licensed physicians in
attendance at all boxing matches; 20 9 (2) a 30-day hiatus between
fights extending to 60 days if the fighter suffered a knockout in
his previous bout; 210 (3) post-fight medical examinations; 2 1 and
(4) medical insurance provided by promoters.2 1 2 The bill authorized the council to study the use of protective headgear during
fights, 21" and to develop and institute a fighter's passport book
for use in New Jersey.2 14
Additionally, the legislation required background investigations of all state-licensed boxing promoters 21 5 and approval of
*

fans to lose interest in the sport, we won't need to ban boxing, it'll die
a natural death.
Id.
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215

A. 2204, 203d Leg., 1st Sess. (March 6, 1986).
Id. at 6 (statement accompanying bill).
Id. § 8a.
Id. 8b.
Id. § 8f.
Id. § 7.
Id. § 9.
Id. § 8.
Id. § 10.
Id. § 3.
Id. § 2(f).
A. 2204 § 2 c-d.
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any promoter conducting bouts in Atlantic City casinos under
strict state casino regulations.21 6 It prohibited involvement in the
leadership of the boxing sanctioning groups by State Athletic
Control Board members or employees.21 7 On October 20, 1986,
the New Jersey Assembly approved the bill. 8
Reaction to the proposed legislation was mixed. One controversial provision concerned whether the Medical Advisory
Council should be an advisory group as originally intended
under the 1985 legislation or whether it should become a rulemaking body. In testimony before the Assembly Independent
and Regional Authorities Committee, the SCI Commissioner
urged that the Medical Council be given power to promulgate
binding rules and regulations. "219
G. New Jersey State Athletic Control Board Regulation of Boxing:
Suggestions for Further Reform
It is still unclear how successful the revamped New Jersey
State Athletic Control Board (SACB) will be in its governance of
boxing in New Jersey. Adequate funding remains a concern and
will affect the board's success over the next few years. Effective
implementation of new reforms will be difficult without proper
financing.
Finding qualified personnel to operate the board might also
pose a problem. Management should not be limited to only those
individuals who have "hands-on" experience in the boxing
world, because personnel with sport management backgrounds
and degrees are available today. Administrative qualifications
should be given preference in hiring personnel for the board
while experience within the boxing profession should remain an
important qualification.
220
The SACB, of course, may promulgate its own regulations
or accept proposals from other state agencies. For instance, the
Attorney General's office, to which the SACB reports, might sug§ 5.
2204 § 4.
218 See 76 N.J. Leg. Index (1988-89). The bill preceded an identical bill, A. 508.
Id. The Assembly passed A. 508 on January 25, 1988, the Senate approved it on
March 28, 1988 and the Governor signed the bill into law on May 4, 1988. Id. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:2A-8 (West Cum. Supp. 1989).
219 See generally Remington, Assembly Panel Hears Split 'Decision' on Boxing Reforms,
Star Ledger, Apr. 30, 1986, at 10, col. 1.
220 See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE 13:46-8.19.
216 A. 2204
217 A.
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gest a regulation. 2 2 ' Press releases, which are often distributed
after such regulations are implemented, inform concerned parties and the general public that reform is taking place in the
industry.
Further efforts are needed to ensure that those involved in
boxing, especially the boxers, are made aware of SACB rules and
regulations. The numerous SACB rules and regulations should
be codified in a handbook. Moreover, the SACB should also
develop a manual, in an understandable format, containing pertinent information affecting boxers. Boxers would then understand that SACB is an advocate of the fighters' economic,
medical, and safety-related rights.
IV.

A.

FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO REFORM BOXING

HistoricalAttempts To Regulate and Reform Boxing

Federal attempts to regulate professional boxing began in
1960 when the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
investigated the sport. 22 2 The subcommittee's four-year investigation focused on the inadequacy of states' control of the boxing
industry and the presence of organized crime in the sport.223
Legislation introduced by the Senate in 1961 and 1963 would
have established an Office of United States Boxing Commissioner within the Department of Justice. 2 24 The Office would

have been authorized to establish rules and regulations in all areas of the sport, including (1) contracts (television included) between parties, (2) physical examination of boxers, (3) centralized
data collection of statistics on each fighter and their fights, and
(4) license issuance, suspension and revocation.2 2 5 Provisions in

each bill allowed for judicial review of the commissioner's actions
as well as criminal penalties for violation of the law and
regulations. 2 6
221 For example, in a letter dated June 20, 1984, from Irwin I. Kimmelman, Attorney General, to Robert W. Lee, Deputy Commissioner of the State Athletic
Commission, the Attorney General suggested that the Commission (predecessor of
the SACB) review its rules involving boxing gloves (available in the files of the Seton
Hall Law Review).
222 Hearings on S. 1474 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Commit-

tee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
223 See H.R. REP. No. 188, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 5 (1963).
224 Id.

225 See S. 1474, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. 1182, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963).
226 Id.
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While neither of the bills totally preempted state regulation
of boxing, both would have established minimum national standards for the states to model. Senator Clair Engle, a co-sponsor
of S. 1182, stated that states had failed to regulate the profession
because of their lack of regulatory power and control over the
interstate aspects of the business.22 7 Neither bill introduced received congressional action. In 1964, however, Congress enacted a law which made bribery in connection with a sporting
event a federal crime, thus addressing one of the concerns of the
failed legislation.228
In 1965, the House of Representatives endorsed legislation
creating a Federal Boxing Commission. 2 29 The bill, H.R. 8635,

would have established an independent three-member Federal
Boxing Commission "authorized to license boxers, managers,
agencies, promoters, matchmakers, referees, judges or any other
person or business connected with the broadcast or telecast of
boxing matches across interstate lines or into foreign coun3
The Commission would have had the power to prevent
tries.''22
the telecast or broadcast of any boxing event determined to be
affected by bribery, collusion or racketeering. 2 1' Despite strong
support, the Senate failed to pass the bill, primarily due to the
untimely death of Senator Kefauver, the bill's primary
proponent.23 2
Between 1965 and 1977, Congress did not address the issue
of professional boxing reform. Then, in 1977 the Subcommittee
on Communications of the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce conducted oversight hearings on network
sports practices. 233 The Committee focused on the business relationship between Don King Productions and the American
Broadcast Company regarding their joint production of the U.S.
Boxing Championships.2 s4 The Committee had three basic concerns:
Cong. Rec. S5,031 (daily ed. March 28, 1963) (statement of Senator Engle).
Id.
229 See H.R. 8635, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 See Hearings on H.R. 2726 on the Creation of a Federal Boxing Board Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 24 (1979) (statement of Congressman Edward P.
Beard).
. 233 See generally Oversight HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Comm. of the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Hearings on Network Sports Practices, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., 95-223 (1977).
234 Id.
227
228
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"consumer fraud, misrepresentation of a sporting event in the
media, and potential for conflicts of interest when a television
network purchases the exclusive television rights to a particular
fighter.' '235
In 1979, the Subcommittee on Labor Standards of the
House Committee on Education and Labor held hearings on The
FederalBoxing ControlAct of 1979, which proposed the creation of a
Federal Boxing Control Board within the Department of Labor. 23 6 The bill would have created a three-member Federal

Boxing Board with the authority to prescribe and enforce labor
standards applicable to the conduct of boxing and to inquire into
other requirements relating to the sport.2 3 The "Findings and
Policy" section of the bill stated that Congress believed that it
advanced the interest of both the public and the boxing profession for the federal government to oversee the regulation of professional boxing due to the inadequacy of existing federal and
state regulatory efforts.23 8 Under the legislation, the board
would have had the power to prohibit a boxing match which
might be "affected by . . .bribery, collusion, intentional losing,

racketeering, extortion, or the use of unlawful threats, coercion,
intimidation, or violence.

' 23 9

The board would have possessed

broad subpoena powers and the ability to hold investigatory
hearings. 24 0 Failure to obey the board's subpoena order would

have brought the action under the jurisdiction of the United
States District Courts.24 '
The bill required all "boxing matches and boxers participating in such matches" to be registered with the Federal Boxing
Board.242 No match would be allowed nor would a boxer be allowed to fight in a match without board registration.243 This
sweeping rule would have served to alleviate the chronic complaints regarding centralized data on fighters and the lack of a
definite rating system. Additionally, since a boxer's registration
would be suspended for thirty days after a knockout or technical
knockout, the process would have provided more safety meas235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243

Id.
H.R. 2726, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
Id. § 4(a).
Id. § 2(a)(1),(2),(3).
Id. § 7(a)(3).
id. § 9(a)-(f).
Id. § 9(e)-(f).
Id. § 5(a).
Id. § 5(b).
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ures for boxers.244
In contrast with similar bills introduced at later congressional sessions, 24 5 H.R. 2726 did not contain a provision directing the board to prescribe regulations governing minimum
standards for equipment and facilities to ensure the physical
safety of professional boxers participating in registered boxing
matches. The bill directed the board to prescribe: (1) fair labor
standard regulations for minimum rates of compensation or
other consideration; (2) minimum environmental standards to be
met at the sites of registered boxing matches; and (3) minimum
standards for availability of medical services and facilities.2 4 6
As its final provision the bill disclaimed any attempt to prohibit state agencies or instrumentalities from exercising their regulatory powers over professional boxing except to the extent that
it did not conflict with H.R. 2726.247 Comments elicited during
the 1979 hearings indicated Congress' disinclination to interfere
in an area traditionally controlled and monitored by the states.
John Condon, representing Madison Square Garden Corporation, suggested an alternative to a Federal Boxing Board in a
Uniform Boxing Control Act to be adopted by each state which
would prescribe consistent standards for the promotion and
presentation of boxing bouts throughout the nation.24 8 Mr. Condon stressed that his suggestion would not only promote uniformity of regulation but would also reserve for each state,
control of basically local concerns. 4 9
The subcommittee took no further action on H.R. 2726 beyond the hearings held in March and April. The measure languished for the duration of the congressional session and federal
legislative attempts at boxing reform again fell short of their
mark.
B.

Recent FederalEfforts To Regulate and Reform Boxing

During the 1980s, several attempts were made to reform and
regulate boxing. These efforts have been led largely by RepreId.
See, e.g., H.R. 1751, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 134, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987).
246 H.R. 2726, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (1)-(6) (1979).
247 Id. § 15.
248 Hearings on H.R. 2726, supra note 232, at 90-92 (statement of Mr. John
Condon).
249 Id.
244

245
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sentatives Florio, Williams, and Richardson, who introduced legislation concerning boxing reform.
In 1983, two House subcommittees held hearings on separate bills affecting professional boxing. 250 The House Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism held hearings
on H.R. 1778, introduced by Florio, which would have established a Congressional Advisory Commission on Boxing to study
and "make ... recommendations to the Congress ... on... the
establishment of uniform Federal standards for professional boxing events held in the United States." ' 25 ' The Commission would
address "licensing requirements, including proficiency standards
and evaluation, for boxers, promoters, .... and all other ring officials; health and medical requirements ....
safety requirements
and performance standards for equipment and facilities,
bonding requirements.... insurance requirements ....
and fines
and penalties [for failure to comply with the regulations]. 2 5 2
The Committee argued that a Federal Boxing Commission
with broad authority over all aspects of boxing might not be the
only viable alternative.2 5 3 For instance, it advised assessing the
ability of each state to implement and enforce uniform standards
as promulgated at the federal level.2 5 4
The Advisory Commission would have consisted
of ten
members comprised of individuals from State Athletic Commissions, promoters of professional boxing events, physicians, media representatives, professional boxers and persons with special
interest or experience in professional boxing.2 55 The Speaker of
the House of Representatives and Senate Majority Leader were
to appoint members in a prescribed rotation. 2 5 6 The members
would have been required to issue a report within nine months of
its organizational meeting detailing its findings, conclusions and
recommendations for legislation. 257 The Commission would
have been directed to focus on the establishment of classification
and ranking guidelines and to collect and maintain related data
in addition to health and medical data on boxers.2 58
250 See H.R. 1778, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 2498, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983).
251 H.R. 1778, 98 Cong., 1st Sess., § 3 (1983).
252 Id. § 7(1)-(11).
253 Hearing on H.R. 1778, supra note 3, at 223.
254
255
256
257
258

Id. at 221.
H.R. 1778, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4 (a) (1983).
Id.
Id. § 7.
Id. § 7(8)-(9).
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On April 12, 1983 after hearings on H.R. 1778, Representative Richardson introduced a very similar bill, H.R. 2498.259 The

bill differed from Representative Florio's bill only with respect to
the proposed membership of the Commission. Representative
Richardson's bill would have included a specific provision calling
for the appointment of two physicians "with special knowledge
or expertise with respect to the health and medical dangers associated with professional boxing.

' 260

Representative Florio's bill,

alternatively, would only have required appointment of two
Commission members "from a list of six submitted jointly by the
American Medical Association and the Association of Ringside
Physicians. "261 In all other aspects, however, the two bills, as
originally introduced, were identical.
H.R. 2498 was referred to the Committee on Education and
Labor.262 Representative Williams sponsored amendments redesignating the study Commission as the Congressional Advisory
Panel on Boxer Safety. The amended version reworded the section regarding the panel membership. Rather than stipulating
that one member would represent the media, the revised section
allowed for two members to be appointed from among "individuals not involved in the presentation or regulation of professional
boxing events. ' 263 The Committee Report reinforced this position by stating that for "purposes of this section .... representa-

tives of the media shall not be considered to be involved in the
presentation or regulation of boxing. "264 The Committee reported favorably on the bill and recommended passage of the
amended version.2 65
Section seven of the bill, originally identical to the corresponding section of H.R. 1778, Representative Florio's bill, was
revised and reworked. 266 As evidence of this revision, the panel
was directed to recommend "whether . . . professional boxing
should be abolished. '2 67 Indeed, the original subcommittee had

heard medically documented testimony calling for a ban on
68
boxing.2
259

See H.R. 2498, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).

260

Id. § 4.

261
262
263

H.R. 1778, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (a)(1) (1983).
H.R. REP. No. 188, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983).
See H.R. 2498, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1983).

264

Id.

265
266
267
268

H.R. REP. No. 188, 98th Cong, 1st Sess. 2 (1983).
See H.R. 2498, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1983).
Id.
Hearingson H.R. 1778, supra note 3, at 51, 62. George D. Lundberg, M.D., in a
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As compared with H.R. 1778, H.R. 2498 included issues not
previously addressed under Representative Florio's proposed
legislation. For instance, the committee suggested that officials
register professional boxing matches and collect information on
the outcome of each fight in a central data bank in addition to
collecting such data on boxers, promoters, officials, and other
personnel connected with the sport.2 6 9 Bills introduced in later
congressional sessions expanded and clarified these data collection procedures.2 7 °
The committee's report on H.R. 2498 also included those
minority views which criticized the involvement of the federal
government in an area previously regulated only by professional
leagues and associations.2 7' Advocates of the minority view
urged members not to support the bill.2 72 Representative Florio
later stated that the bill establishing the advisory entity was defeated when opponents erroneously claimed that it would open
the door to federal regulation of all professional sports. 273
Proponents of the measure consistently point to the lack of
"self policing" inherent within the industry of professional boxing. The sport, however, unlike other professional sports, has
usually been regulated by state authorities or commissions. For
no apparent reason other than state regulatory involvement, professional boxing has never had a strong professional association
to regulate the entire sport in the United States. Heavy influence
of international organizations and personnel contributed to the
fragmentation of professional boxing since neither the states nor
the federal government have jurisdiction over foreign matches
held outside of the United States.
At the same time that Representatives Florio and Richardson
were promoting their respective bills, Representative Williams
introduced H. R. 1751 on March 2, 1983.274 The bill would have
prepared statement referred to an editorial he had written calling for a ban on boxing. The editorial, entitled Boxing Should be Banned in Civilized Countries, had been
published in The Journal of the American Medical Association. See 249 J. A.M.A. 250
(Jan. 14, 1983).
269 H.R. 2498, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1983).
270 See H.R. 1689, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(c) (1985); H.R. 2127, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 3 (1985).
271 H.R. REP. No. 2498, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1983).
272 Id.
273 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 241
(1985) (statement of Representative Florio).
274 See H.R. 1751, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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established a Federal Boxing Commission within the Department
of Labor with the power to "establish and enforce uniform standards relating to compensation, working conditions, safety of
boxing equipment and facilities and other factors involved in the
2 75
conduct of professional boxing.

The bill, entitled the Federal Boxing Protection Act of 1983,276
stated that it was in the best interests of the public and professional boxing to subject the sport to governmental oversight
since state and federal rules and regulations did not provide adequate protection. 2 7 Under the bill, the Boxing Commission
would have consisted of five citizen-members appointed by the
Secretary of Labor.278 Since this commission differed from the
legislative study commission advocated by Representatives Florio
and Richardson, there was no need for the House Speaker or
Senate Majority Leader to appoint members.
While similar to H.R. 2726, the newer bill granted slightly
more power to the Commission, authorizing it to set minimum
standards for "equipment and facilities necessary to reasonably
ensure the physical safety of professional boxers participating in
registered boxing matches.

'2 79

This particular aspect had been

missing in the 1979 version. The Commission was expanded
from three to five members and would act as a national screening
and control board for the registration of boxers, boxing matches,
boxing contracts and agreements, and the establishment of medical and safety standards. H.R. 1751 and H.R. 2726 were identical
in that boxers could not participate in a match unless the match
and each boxer was registered pursuant to the requirements set
forth in each bill.280
The bill would have immediately allowed the federal government to regulate many important aspects of professional boxing
as opposed to establishing a commission to act in an advisory
capacity. Representative Williams' bill mandated establishment
of a Boxing Commission fully empowered to regulate professional boxing. Once again, however, Congress took no final action regarding passage of a boxing bill.
Two bills introduced in 1985 attempted new solutions to old
275 Id. § 2(b).
276 Id. § 1.
277 Id. § 2(a)(1) & (2).
278 Id. § 4.
279 Id. § 8(1)(D).
280 Compare H.R. 1751,

1st Sess. § 5 (1979).

99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) with H.R. 2726, 96th Cong.,
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problems. H.R. 1689 would have created a non-profit entity entitled the American Boxing Corporation. 28 ' The objective was to
create a mechanism for efficient government oversight of professional boxing and to establish minimum health and safety standards for boxers.2 8 2 The corporation was to: (1) establish model
state boxing commission standards and provide financial and
technical assistance to states to help them comply with those.
standards; (2) sanction boxing matches in states implementing
the model standards, and (3) establish United States boxing
championships.2a3
The model state standards were to be based on fair labor
standards, allow for a system for state registration of both boxers
and boxing matches and were to apply to contracts, agreements,
arrangements and understandings pertaining to the conduct or
promotion of any boxing match. 28 4 The states which chose to
join the corporation could apply to it for funding to aid in establishing similar model standards. Member states would be expected to abide by the rules and regulations of the corporation.
The corporation's six-member board of directors would be appointed by the President with approval of the Senate.2 8 5 At least
three members were required to have been involved in professional boxing previously, and all members were prohibited from
engaging in any aspect of the sport while serving on the
Board.2 8 6
The bill also addressed an issue previously debated:
whether states could comply with federally mandated standards
without any monetary assistance from the federal government.
Although the bill did not establish a funding source from which
the states could obtain grants, section nine of the bill granted the
corporation the power to generate funds much in the same way a
private corporation establishes its existence and continues in
operation.28 7
Representative Richardson introduced a competing bill,
H.R. 2127, on April 18, 1985.288 That bill, as described by Representative Florio, "does not regulate boxing, nor does it in any
281

H.R. 1689, 99th Cong., 1st Sess (1985).
§ 4.

282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 See

§ 5(c).
§ 2(a).
§ 3(d).
§ 9.
H.R. 2127, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
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way affect the ability of states or localities to regulate boxing. Instead, it simply provides a mechanism by which uniform health
and safety standards may be developed and provides incentives
to comply with those standards.

' 28 9

The bill also established a

non-profit corporation known as the United States Boxing Commission. The sixteen-member board had twelve voting members
appointed by the President and six non-voting members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Members included acting State Athletic or Boxing Commissioners,
boxers, trainers, promoters, sports-medicine physicians, private
citizens with knowledge of or interest in the sport, members of
the United States House of Representatives and Senate, and
members of the boxing media.29 °
The Boxing Commission would be empowered to "serve as
the coordinating body for all efforts in the United States to establish and maintain uniform minimum health and safety standards
for professional boxing." ' 29 ' The Commission, however, would
not control "contracts for the television distribution of boxing
events" or "engage in the sanctioning of boxing events or the
ranking of professional boxers. "292
The bill was referred to the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce and was considered along with other bills at a
hearing before that Committee's Subcommittee on Commerce,
Transportation and Tourism on July 30, 1985. Representative
Jack Fields supported by Representative Richardson, introduced
three major amendments incorporating provisions previously included in different pieces of proposed legislation. These included provisions allowing the Commission to: (1) make grants
to states and localities to assist them with their local commissions; (2) add two foreign citizens as non-voting members of the
Commission to facilitate cooperation between the new federal
entity and international boxing organizations; and (3) to provide
a central data bank for background information on managers,
cut-men, promoters, etc., in addition to the professional boxer,
since the Commission was authorized to certify these
individuals.293

In October 1986, Representative Richardson introduced a
289
290
291
292
293

See Hearings on H.R. 2127, supra note 273, at 241.
H.R. 2127, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a) (1985).
Id. § 2.
Id.
See Hearings on H.R. 2127, supra note 273.

910

SETON HALL L4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 19:865

compromise bill, H.R. 5654, which incorporated basic provisions
of earlier bills.294 The bill would have established a United States
Boxing Corporation as a non-profit entity. 295 The compromise
bill contained the purposes of prior bills in a centralized, unified
format. The language was much stronger than that contained in
the preceding versions. In order for a state to receive a grant or
technical assistance from the corporation to implement the
Model State Boxing Standards as promulgated by the corporation, it would have to demonstrate that it had an "effective plan
for meeting the requirements" of establishing or maintaining a
state agency. 29 6
The corporation's data bank would contain a "list of professional boxers, medical records, win-loss records, size, weight and
business associates of such boxers, and information pertinent to
the sport of boxing on boxing promoters, matchmakers, managers, trainers, cut-men, referees, physicians and any other personnel" determined by the corporation as having a role in
professional boxing.297 Through the establishment of the corporation, the legislation sought to encourage states to apply for
grants and technical assistance, thereby also obtaining corporate
certification. Once a state was certified, both boxers and the
matches in which they participated would have to receive certification by the corporation.298 In the event a certified individual
participated in a bout in an uncertified state, certification could
be withdrawn, making the individual ineligible to participate in
boxing events in certified states.299
The corporation's board was to consist of twelve members.
Nine voting members were to be appointed by the President
from a list supplied by the Senate and House. 30 0 These members
were to include two persons from among boxers, trainers,
judges, promoters or sports medicine physicians currently active
in the sport, two State Athletic or Boxing Commissioners and
five persons with an interest in and knowledge of the sport, but
with no present financial interest in boxing. 30 ' The three nonvoting members would include one person from the boxing me294
295
296
297

298
299
300
301

See
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

H.R. 5654, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).

§ 1.
§ 2(b)(A).
2(c).

Id. § 3(1) & (2).
Id. § 5.
Id.
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dia, one foreign citizen with an interest in and knowledge of the
sport and a representative from the USA Amateur Boxing
Federation.30 2
Although H.R. 5654 received strong support, Representative Richardson's bill was not passed into law. The second session of the 99th Congress was extremely busy and pressure filled
as a result of tax-reform legislation. Although the Richardson bill
passed in the House, there was no Senate counterpart. Since
there was no compromise bill ready to be referred to a conference committee and since there was insufficient time
to introduce
30 3
the House version in the Senate, the bill failed.
Not surprisingly, Representative Dorgan introduced H.R.
134, entitled the FederalBoxer ProtectionAct of 1987, on January 6,
1987. 30' The bill was identical to the bills introduced in 1983
and 1985. Surprisingly, however, the new legislation bore little
resemblance to the compromise bill, H.R. 5654, passed by the
House in the previous session. H.R. 134 placed all control of the
sport of boxing within the Department of Labor and was
mandatory in its scope; each state had to comply with the legislation.30 5 In the early 1980s, Congress avoided legislation imposing additional controls upon an already highly regulated
governmental structure. The introduction of the strictly worded
H.R. 134 was viewed as strategic in nature. In the event that a
reintroduction of a bill similar to the 99th Congress' H.R. 5654
was viewed unfavorably by Congress and the boxing community,
then H.R. 134 would already be in place, ready to be promoted
for passage. It was in the legislator's best interests to have the
mandatory and voluntary bills side by side, ready for discussion,
once any hearings were scheduled to consider the merits of each
piece of legislation.
A bill identical to the compromise H.R. 5654 was introduced
302 Id. § 5(a)(6).
303 See Letter from Congressman Pat Williams of Montana to Mr. Larry Hazard,
Commissioner of the New Jersey State Athletic Control Board (Jan. 21, 1987). Mr.
Williams writes:
Unfortunately, passage by the House was secured just a few days
before the 99th Congress adjourned, leaving the Senate with no time
to consider the measure.... Because the Senate did not act upon the
measure in the 99th Congress, the boxing legislation now will have to
be reintroduced in this new 100th Congress and passed again by the
House before it reaches the Senate for consideration.
Id. (available in the files of the Seton Hall Law Review).
304 See H.R. 134, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
305 Id.
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May 6, 1987 as H.R. 2305.306 It contained minor technical cor-,
rections concerning the first organizational meeting of the Boxing Corporation Board. Additionally, a provision allowed
individuals with prior felony records to apply for certification after a hearing on the matter. Both H.R. 134 and H.R. 2305 had
been referred to the Committees on Educational Labor and Energy and Commerce with hearings scheduled during 1987.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although most states monitor boxing to some extent, there
are no established uniform standards of any type in connection
with the sport. Since boxing historically has been governed by
states, the extent to which the federal government should regulate boxing has always been in issue. Should the government
look to enforce mandatory rules and regulations under the guise
of fair labor standards, or instead Offer voluntary membership in
a United States Boxing Corporation? As opponents suggest, regulation of boxing might lead to regulation of other professional
sports. Testimony indicates, however, that boxing has never
been self-policed in the same manner as other professional
sports.
Without federal legislative intervention to formulate uniform health, safety, labor and statistical standards, the problems
of the boxing industry will continue. Since 1960, the federal government has recognized a need for intervention in the sport of
boxing. Tragic events such as ring-side death of boxers, and data
on the health effects of boxing continue to propel the issue of
regulation into the public limelight. Minimum national standards must be promulgated especially in the areas of medical
treatment, training, equipment, statistical data compilation and
enforcement of these standards. In the absence of any affirmative
action, there may be a resurgence of those organizations and interest groups, such as the AMA, that seek a complete ban on the
sport of boxing. Congress should affirmatively respond to the
public, the boxing community and the fight fans by enacting legislation aimed at protecting the fighter who chooses to practice
his craft.
Without minimum uniform national standards for boxing
regulation, New Jersey's efforts to regulate boxing will be somewhat ineffective since the state can only keep track of boxers,
306 H.R. 2305, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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managers, etc., when they are operating in the state. Once boxers
or other regulated individuals leave the state, their activities are
difficult to monitor. Regulated individuals are responsible for
self-reporting their activities creating an inherently unreliable
system. Any of the proposed federal legislation would help solve
this problem. New Jersey can now only track the boxers and
their fight records for boxing cards held within its boundaries
and must rely on the hearsay of the boxer to report results from
outside the state. With a national clearinghouse for fight data,
New Jersey would be able to update its records using federal data
and would be able to detect any inaccuracies in records submitted by the boxer.
The proposed federal regulations, if enacted, would help
New Jersey's efforts to reform and regulate the boxing industry.
If maximum standards were established on a federal level, it
could pose a conflict. Few, however, expect that any federal enactment would match the comprehensiveness of the New Jersey
regulation. As long as minimum standards are established by any
federal legislation there should be no conflict with New Jersey's
regulation of the sport.
New Jersey's efforts to regulate boxing have been laudable.
It remains to be seen how effective its efforts will be without the
implementation of federal legislation setting minimum national
standards. Without federal regulation, loopholes exist to enable
unscrupulous managers and boxers to evade some of the reforms
instituted by New Jersey. This is particularly troublesome in documenting fight records and injuries to boxers.
New Jersey must decide whether to back its reform efforts
with sufficient funding to allow the New Jersey State Athletic
Board to effectively institute the new regulations. On one hand,
increased funding is not cost justified in relation to the monies
brought into the state from taxation of boxing events. That position, however, ignores two factors. First, the highly taxed gaming industry relies heavily on boxing to attract consumers to
Atlantic City casinos. Second, New Jersey's reform efforts must
be backed with adequate funding to insure that such reforms are
implemented and enforced.
As to a ban on boxing in the state, New Jersey officials have
wisely ignored those recommendations. While the SCI's efforts
were commendable, its call for a ban on boxing was overreaching
and unrealistic.
New Jersey is effectively gaining control over boxing and has
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set a good standard for other states and the federal government
to follow. Due to boxing's importance to the state's economy,
New Jersey must continue its efforts to reform the sport. Such
reform efforts will ultimately lead to quality boxers, managers
and other involved parties and will protect the individual boxer's
health, safety, and overall management-which is the underlying
justification for any boxing regulation.
The final question is why Congress has not instituted federal
regulation of boxing. There seem to be a number of potential
reasons for this oversight. First, there are the pressures exerted
by groups which would be adversely affected by any regulatory
process, no matter how minimal the regulation. These groups
include the worldwide sanctioning bodies, the television networks, and the individual boxing promoters and managers.
Second, states which have no existing regulatory process frequently oppose federal regulation which might require institution of their own in-state regulatory program, increasing the
state's budget. Many states now attract boxing bouts because
they have no regulation. If uniform standards are implemented,
unregulated states would risk losing bouts and the resulting economic benefits.
Third, Congress has historically resisted regulating the
sports industry. Many legislators worry that boxing would be the
first step in a regulatory scheme that could ultimately include all
amateur and professional sports. Therefore, some legislators do
not support boxing reform no matter how minimal the standards
or laudable the goals. Finally, for the last few years, there has
been opposition from those who supported the Reagan administration's deregulation policy.
New Jersey has set a standard for the rest of the nation to
follow in its regulation of boxing. The federal government must
follow suit to make the sport safe for its participants. Only with
minimum federal regulation, especially the establishment of
boxer passports, can states which want stringent regulation be
successful with their programs.
The several federal attempts at regulating boxing have all
contained a corporation or commission form of governance that
would establish varying forms of unified regulations, rules and
certifications. Such an approach should be expected on a federal
level, since state regulation varies from non-regulation to a
highly regulated situation such as that in New Jersey. Any federal
approach would institute at least minimum regulatory standards
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for boxing throughout the country and bring a needed sense of
order to a sport historically thought of as administratively chaotic. It is time for Congress to implement some form of minimum regulation of the boxing industry to ensure the safety of the
participants and the integrity of the sport.

